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With the beginning of powered, manned flight, the piston engine drove a propeller 
or multiple propellers to provide the thrust for lift required to overcome the forces of drag 
and gravity for flight. As aircraft speeds gradually increased over time, the power needed 
to overcome the aerodynamic inefficiencies of the propeller to greater speeds and altitudes 
were quickly realized as a hindrance to the potential of aircraft. With the turbojet engine, 
this new mechanism and subsequent aerodynamic changes revolutionized aircraft to 
increased speeds and altitude never before achievable with a piston engine. The United 
States, after acquiring further and more extensive turbojet engine knowledge from the 
British during World War II, steadily developed the technology. In a relatively brief amount 
of time, the turbojet was able to power aircraft reliably beyond the speed of sound.  
 The General Electric axial flow J79 turbojet engine generated a lasting 
technological innovation with the first use of production ready variable incidence stator 
vanes that allowed jet engines to begin to overcome compressor stall. Compressor stall 
can occur as air flows through the jet engines various air compressing guide and stator 
vanes with low air pressure building just behind a given blade. The low pressure air cell 
can cause damaged vanes; build to the point of causing a rotational stall which critically 
impedes the rotation of the engine, can migrate to the combustion chamber starving the 
fuel of oxygen needed for ignition, or cause the complete reversal of air flow within the 
engine. These events can cause minor to catastrophic engine damage or even complete 
engine failure. Variable incidence stator vanes were no longer static but were adjustable to 
allow the optimum angle of airflow around the various vanes and thus controlled the 
compressibility of the airflow through the engine reducing the likelihood of stalls. The use 
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of the this variable stator design within the J79 turbojet allowed the engine to be smaller in 
diameter, removed complexity, and weighed considerably less than other competing 
turbojet engines of the time, laying the groundwork for a production run of over thirty years 
and speeds exceeding Mach 2, or twice the speed of sound. 
The purpose of this study is to analyze the General Electric J79 Turbojet engine as 
it relates to its contemporary turbojet engines, the aircraft it powered, and the effects for 
General Electric and the military powerplant industry. Additionally, the purpose of this 
study is to illustrate how the engine helped assist aircraft designers and their companies to 
satisfy Armed Forces proposals for increased speeds, payloads, systems and the missions 
to meet a national philosophy of deterrence of a newly perceived threat during the Cold 
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During the early months of the Korean War, propeller driven Boeing B-29 
Superfortresses roamed the skies during daylight bombing raids over Korea virtually 
unopposed.1  Exceeding even the Manhattan Project that produced the atomic bomb, the 
B-29 was the most expensive weapons program of World War II, and one of the most 
advanced bombers of the time with a pressurized personnel compartment and remote 
control gun turrets to protect the aircraft.2 With the advent of the Soviet Union into the 
conflict, and supplying the jet powered Mikoyen-Gurevich MiG-15 (North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization [N.A.T.O.] code named Fagot) to the communist North Korea, the fortunes of 
the B-29 Superfortress quickly changed.  The jet powered MiG-15’s had the speed and 
power to easily climb from below or swoop in from behind before the tail gunner could 
react or shoot the MiG down.3 With staggering losses to the expensive B-29 aircraft 
mounting and straight-winged Lockheed F-80 Shooting Stars incapable of being fighter 
escorts, United States Air Force (U.S.A.F.) commanders quickly changed tactics to night 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Robert Frank Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: Basic Thinking in the United States Air 
2 Phillips Payson O’Brien, How the War Was Won (Cambridge, United Kingdom: 
Cambridge University Press, 2015), 48-49. 
3 Lou Fulgaro, Giants Over Korea: A Sky too Far (Bloomington, Indiana: Stars and Stripes 
Publishing, 2003), 87-88. 
Soviet pilots had trained against Tu-4’s, which was a copy of the B-29 acquired during 
WWII. They learned the gunner could not see an aircraft climbing from below which was 
not an issue during WWII since most propeller aircraft did not possess the power or speed 
to vertically climb to attack the B-29’s. 
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attacks in an attempt to decrease losses.4 The United States Armed Forces commanders 
learned a lesson: speed, altitude and power equaled air superiority. 
During and after the Korean War, the U.S. Armed Forces would seek to resolve 
their perceived problems of lack of speed and power during the jet age. The capabilities of 
the MiG-15 exposed and endangered the United States Air Force Strategic Air Command’s 
(S.A.C.) approach to bombarding its Cold War enemy, the Soviet Union, over its homeland 
with conventional or nuclear armament. The future of the United States as a leader of 
Western countries, and as the perceived, legitimate adversary could be openly questioned 
if the deficiency was not corrected. The fortune of S.A.C.’s very mission and viability 
depended on its ability to deliver a bomber or interceptor carrying a nuclear deterrent that 
could fly higher and faster than the Soviet Union’s defenses was necessitated. From both 
the aircraft and jet engine manufacturers, the boundaries of technology were pushed in 
order to meet the challenging requests, to stay as a supplier to an emerging military 
customer, and to maintain the U.S.’s newly found status as a superpower.  The companies 
that stayed in business as a supplier to the U.S. Armed Forces would gamble with 
technological innovations to achieve pioneering results.  
Companies that competed for aircraft and powerplant contracts needed to 
overcome daunting technological issues as desired speeds went into unchartered regions. 
Both the companies and the military financed explorations into the unknown to attempt to 
accomplish goals of greater speeds and higher thrust. In the quest for higher speeds, one 
of the issues encountered was compressor stall. There are several types of compressor 
stall that occur when the aircraft is at certain speeds or angles as the jet engine ingests 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Igor Seidov, Red Devils Over the Yalu: A Chronicle of Soviet Aerial Operations in the 
Korean War 1950-1953, trans. Stuart Britton (West Midlands, United Kingdom: Helion & 
Company Limited, 2014), 234. 
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more air than it can consume causing a disruption of service anywhere from shut down, 
internal damage of components, to complete engine loss.  Besides operations outside of 
an aircraft or engine’s operating parameters, or ingestion of foreign objects, compressor 
stall can occur as compressed air flows through the guide and stator vane stages with low 
air pressure building just behind a given blade. The low pressure air cell can cause 
damaged vanes, build to the point of causing a rotational stall critically impeding the 
rotation of the engine, and/or migrate to the combustion chamber starving the fuel of 
oxygen needed for ignition. A compressor stall can become a compressor surge, which 
occurs when a complete reversal or interruption of airflow within the engine causes loss of 
compression. Engine manufacturers looked for ways to resolve the issues by devising 
creative methods or equipment to the early jet engines. One innovative attempt to resolve 
the issue of compressor stall was the General Electric J79 turbojet engine.  
The G.E. J79 was not the first jet engine to attempt to address the issue of 
compressor stall, but it combined relatively low weight, size, and fuel consumption, while 
still producing high thrust for supersonic speeds beyond Mach 2 by introducing or 
advancing a number of new technologies including variable stators, which reduced the 
probability of compressor stall.  The variable stator system in the J79 controlled the first six 
rows of guide vanes that automatically adjusted to regulate the amount of air into the 
engine, and forced them at the proper angle to increase air pressure for combustion. The 
J79 turbojet variable stator technology would be utilized on multiple subsequent jet 
engines not just within G.E., and powered multiple military aircraft to supersonic speeds. 
The development of the J79 turbojet engine advanced the technology surrounding jet 
engines, confirmed General Electric’s position as a leader in jet engines, and was a major 
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contributing factor that provided the means to progress military aircraft, giving S.A.C the 
potential ability to achieve its strategic bombing objective. 
G.E. did not invent the jet engine, and it did not produce the first jet engine 
concept in the United States, but it did produce a licensed copy of a British jet engine that 
powered the United States first jet propelled aircraft, the Bell XP-59A Airacomet.5 G.E. was 
an early leader in steam engines, and turbo-superchargers used to compress air for piston 
engines in aircraft at higher altitudes, but had not developed a jet engine prior to the 
licensed W.1X centrifugal turbojet designed by Frank Whittle for the XP-59A.6 The first 
actual jet engine concept was patented by Maxime Guillaume in 1921, but was never 
produced.7 Other engineers such as Alan Arnold Griffith, Hans Holzwarth, and G.E.’s 
Stanford Moss skirted with the idea, but German Hans Joachim Pabst von Ohain and 
British Frank Whittle developed working turbojet engines in parallel to each other in the 
1930’s.   
In the 1920’s and 1930’s engineers began to realize aircraft would soon reach the 
zenith of their capability with a piston driven propeller. Studies showed as a propeller 
neared or reached supersonic speeds it would encounter compressibility issues, or it was 
moving too fast to grab the air and became ineffective.8 Volatile and potentially damaging 
shock waves could form around propellers or other surfaces as speeds increased to near 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Steve Pace, X-Fighters: USAF Experimental and Prototype Fighters, XP-59 to YF-23 
(Osceola, Wisconsin: Motorbooks International Publishers, 1991), 8.   6	  Ed. Roger D. Launius, Innovation and the Development of Flight (College Station, Texas: 
Texas A&M University Press, 1999), 280. 
7 Maxime Guillaume, "Propulseur par réaction sur l'air," French patent no. 534,801 (filed: 3 
May 1921; issued: 13 January 1922). 
Vaclav Smil, Two Prime Movers of Globalization: The History and Impact of Diesel Engines 
and Gas Turbines (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
Press, 2010), 86-87.  
8 John David Anderson, A History of Aerodynamics and Its Impact on Flying Machines 
(New York, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 319, 396.  
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supersonic speeds. In 1926, a study by B.M. Jones illustrated how aircraft of the time 
wasted two-thirds of their power overcoming preventable aerodynamic drag, which was 
supported by Theodore von Kármán’s own wake drag theory that allowed for the 
calculation of turbulent air induced by airfoils.9  Additionally that year A.A. Griffith 
composed “An Aerodynamic Theory of Turbine Design” in which he believed an axial flow 
turbine could efficiently drive a propeller, and showed the development of a multi-stage 
axial turbine and its benefits.10 In 1929, G.E.’s own Glenn B. Warren suggested the 
propulsion of gas from a jet engine could propel an aircraft to greater speeds than 
achievable at the time, but aerodynamic concerns would need to be resolved.11 
Metallurgical concerns needed to be addressed with proper formulations to solve the 
intense temperatures materials were subjected to within jet engines, but ideas were being 
devised and then refined. When combined with improved aerodynamics and a radically 
different powerplant from the current piston powered propeller, the aircraft could exceed 
speeds far greater than imagined possible.     
Several individuals developed or attempted their own turbojet engine nearly 
simultaneously, but the originators of the engine were Frank Whittle and Hans von Ohain. 
Frank Whittle first submitted a patent for a turbojet engine in 1930, but with only limited 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Edward W. Constant II, “A Model for Technological Change Applied to the Turbojet 
Revolution,” Technology and Culture, Volume 24, Number 4 (October, 1973), 560.  
Theodore von Kármán, Aerodynamics (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1954), 
61-102.  
10 Ian Philpott, The Royal Air Force – Volume 2: An Encyclopedia of the Inter-War Years: 
Volume II: Re-Armament, 1930-1939 (South Yorkshire, Great Britain: Pen & Sword Books 
Ltd., 2008), 197. 
Later tests showed Griffith’s idea did produce a working turbojet engine, but did not 
achieve the efficiency due to compressor blade design.  11	  Glenn B. Warren, “Jet-Propelled Airplanes,” General Electric Review, Volume 55, 1952, 
34-36.  
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support from just his private business Power Jets Limited, he was not able to operate a 
functional engine until 1937.12 The British government supported the advancement of the 
turbojet in 1939, but not until near necessity due to both an impending war, and the 
progress of Whittle and his team developing the jet engine.13 The Power Jets W.1 turbojet 
powered the Gloster E.28/39 on its first flight in May of 1941.  
Whereas Whittle struggled for support during his development of the jet engine, 
Hans von Ohain was able to gain assistance for his endeavors. Von Ohain had patented 
his turbojet design in 1935 without knowledge of Whittle’s patent.14 Von Ohain designed a 
centrifugal turbojet, in which air was compressed through a central impeller before 
combustion, and gained support of his project by Ernst Heinkel, the aircraft builder.  This 
partnership garnered the first jet aircraft, the Heinkel He 178 that first flew in August 1939, 
and the first production jet fighter, the Heinkel He 280. The He 280 was supplanted in a 
competition for a German jet powered fighter aircraft by the more capable Messerschmitt 
Me 262 that terrorized Allied bombers with a speed greater than anything the Allies flew 
against it during WWII.15 With its slightly swept back wings for center of gravity concerns, 
the Me 262 first showed that overwhelming speed could influence or even decide the 
outcome of an air battle.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Frank Whittle, "Improvements relating to the propulsion of aircraft and other vehicles," 
British patent no. 347,206 (filed: January 16, 1930, Issued: April 16, 1931). 
http://v3.espacenet.com/origdoc?DB=EPODOC&IDX=GB347206&F=0&QPN=GB347206 
Edward W. Constant II, “A Model for Technological Change Applied to the Turbojet 
Revolution,” Technology and Culture, Volume 24, Number 4 (October, 1973), 560. 
13 Daniel Ford, “Gentlemen I Give You the Whittle Engine,” Air & Space, 
October/November, 1992, 90-91.   
14 Margaret Conner, Hans von Ohain: Elegance in Flight (Reston, Virginia: American 
Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 2001), 34.  
15 Walter J. Boyne, Roaring Thunder: A Novel of the Jet Age (New York, New York: Tom 
Doherty Associates, LLC., 2006), 89.  
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As jet powered aircraft were about to fly, in the United States other individuals 
started contemplating the need for alternate powerplants to push aircraft to greater speeds 
and started the process of building a jet engine. On the basis of its prior experience with 
the Navy, Westinghouse received a contract on December 8, 1941, the day after the 
Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, for a booster turbojet to assist Navy aircraft in taking off 
from aircraft carriers.16 The engine would not operate until the beginning of 1945, but 
would eventually be modified for the Navy’s first jet powered aircraft, the McDonnell 
Aircraft XFD-1 Phantom, later designated the FH-1. Lockheed Aircraft Company’s Nathan 
Price designed an axial turbojet, in which airfoils rotate around a central datum with 
compressed air flowing parallel to the axis of rotation, designated the L-1000. Price, who 
began work on the engine in 1938, anticipated 5,100 pounds of thrust and a fuel economy 
comparable to contemporary piston engines of similar size. The United States Army Air 
Corps  (U.S.A.A.C.) deemed the overall proposal too potentially problematic due to the 
engine’s complexity, size and mass, along with the intended L-133 aircraft, whose 
revolutionary design proposed forward canards, nose inlet and aft wings. Lockheed was 
awarded a contract to develop the engine despite trepidations from the military about 
aircraft manufacturers producing engines, and the diversion of funds away from piston 
engines needed for the war effort.17 Lockheed was never able to manufacture the engine 
during the war, and efforts to develop the engine were given to Menasco Manufacturing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Anthony Kay, Turbojet: History and Development 1930-1960. Volume 1: Great Britain 
and Germany (Ramsbury, United Kingdom: Crowood Press, 2007), 105-106. 
17 Dennis R. Jenkins & Tony R. Landis, Experimental and Prototype U.S. Air Force Jet 
Fighters (Hinekley, United Kingdom: Midland Publishing, 2008), XI. 
Sterling Michael Pavelec, The Jet Race and the Second World War (Westport, 
Connecticut: Greenwood Publishing, 2007), 138. 
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Company, which would eventually turn over its work to the Wright Aeronautical division of 
the Curtis-Wright Corporation. The engine was never realized for aircraft usage. 
 
 
2.0 The Turbojet Lands in the United States 
 
In February of 1941, U.S. intelligence reports of German and British jet 
development led to the formation of the Durand Committee, whose purpose was to 
coordinate American jet research and development. The chairman of the National Advisory 
Committee for Aeronautics (N.A.C.A.) Vannevar Bush asked William Durand, who helped 
found the N.A.C.A. and provided innovative research into aerodynamics and propellers, to 
head the committee, which included representatives from the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, Johns Hopkins University, National Bureau of Standards, Navy Bureau of 
Aeronautics and the Army Air Force, whose representative was General Henry “Hap” 
Arnold. Arnold arranged for an initial briefing with British officials that included D. Roy 
Shoults, a G.E. turbosupercharger specialist on loan to the United States Army Air Force 
(U.S.A.A.F.) Technical Staff in London. By October 1941, G.E. received a set of W.2B 
centrifugal turbojet drawings, an improved version of the Power Jets W.1, and a W.1X 
engine. The Americanized engine was designated the I-A, and G.E. assembled a team of 
engineers from their turbosupercharger division led by Donald F. “Truly” Warner to improve 
its performance wherever possible. By March 1942, initial tests of the new engine were 
performed that indicated it had compressor stall problems before full speed operation.  
One month later after modifications to the guide vanes, compressors and compressor 
casing, the engine ran up to full speed for 1300 pounds of thrust. Two I-A engines were 
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fitted into the Bell XP-59A Airacomet, and test pilot Bob Stanley flew a couple of short 
initial flights from Muroc Army Airfield on October 1, 1942.18 Subsequent improvements to 
the turbojet engine and comparisons to the British W.2/500 turbojet resulted in a final total 
of 1650 lbs. of thrust and the designation J31 engine, but performance drawbacks to the 
overall aircraft meant it never saw combat and was eventually phased out of inventory by 
1949.19  
General Electric continued to assist in the maturation of the turbojet in the United 
States with the next pursuit/fighter aircraft for the U.S.A.A.F. After failing to build the L-133 
aircraft with the L-1000 jet engine, Clarence “Kelly” Johnson, Lockheed’s chief design 
engineer, was given an opportunity to build the XP-80, a straight winged aircraft around 
the British de Havilland H.1 Goblin Turbojet engine. The engine was to be license built by 
Allis-Chalmers as the J36, but due to production setbacks the aircraft was redesigned 
around the G.E. J33, which was larger, but produced more thrust than the H.1 Goblin. 
Development began in 1943, but no aircraft saw combat during WWII as only two aircraft 
were sent to the European theater for training purposes.20 Due to the end of WWII, 
production of the P-80 ended with 917 aircraft built in September 1945, with Allison having 
won manufacturing rights for the J33 in multiple configurations from G.E.21 The P-80, 
whose military designation was changed to the F-80 Shooting Star in 1947,22 flew in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Muroc Army Airfield would eventually change its name to Edwards Air Force Base after 
test pilot Glen Edwards who was killed along with five other crewmen flying the 
experimental Northrup YB-49 in 1949. 19	  Steve Pace, 17-18.  
20 Don Berliner, Surviving Fighter Aircraft of World War Two: A Global Gide to Location 
and Types (South Yorkshire, Great Britain: Pen & Sword Books, Ltd., 2011), 35.  
21 Marcell Size Knaack, Post-World War II Fighters; 1945-1973 (Dallas, Texas: 
Government Printing Office for the Office of Air Force History, 1986), 4-8.   
22 Department of Defense, DoD 4120-L: Model Designation of Military Aerospace Vehicles, 
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, May, 2004). 
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Korean War, but was outclassed by the faster, more powerful and more maneuverable 
swept wing MiG-15.  
Even with the end of WWII, and the curtailing of most aircraft production, concerns 
over American aircraft capabilities, advanced research and fears of long range attacks 
began to spur ideological changes within the United States Armed Forces. President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s call for 50,000 aircraft at the beginning of the U.S. entering the war 
compelled both the aircraft industry and the Armed Forces to focus on quantity of parts 
versus advanced research.23 When the war ended and the German research into jet 
engines, rockets, and aerodynamics was revealed, Allied combatants quickly gathered up 
as much intelligence and personnel as possible to assist in their research.24 Armed Forces 
personnel realized they were behind in technology, facilities, and their aircraft lacked the 
aerodynamic efficiency of German jets.25 A change was needed to compete with the Soviet 
Union, a new adversary that emerged after the war, as further research was needed in jet 
technology and aerodynamics out of fear of a possible bomber attack over the North Pole 
and to bomb the Soviet Union.  The need to focus on quantity of production was moving 
towards advanced products that pushed the technological envelope, and yielded greater 
results.  	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The pursuit of increased aircraft speeds required a concentrated effort by many 
disciplines and organizations into the research of aerodynamics and thermodynamics, and 
the power demands required. Immediately after the end of WWII, the United States lacked 
the wind tunnel facilities to provide data for testing at high speeds approaching or 
exceeding the speed of sound.26 Collaborating on the research and expenditures, the 
N.A.C.A., Air Force, and Navy prepared in March 1944, a comprehensive research plan for 
fully instrumented piloted aircraft to exceed the speed of sound.27   This association broke 
through a perceived impenetrable barrier with the first airplane to exceed the speed of 
sound on October 14, 1947, when Chuck Yeager piloted the rocket powered Bell XS-1 
(later just the X-1) to 662 miles per hour at 35,000 feet.28  The partnership continued to 
develop experimental aircraft to record flight data, and six years after exceeding Mach 1, 
another rocket-propelled aircraft exceeded Mach 2. The Douglas D-558-II Skyrocket 
piloted by Scott Crossfield reached Mach 2.01 on November 20, 1953, but only for a few 
seconds in a shallow dive with ideal weather conditions, and with strict obedience to a 
previously calculated flight plan.29  Flying and powering an aircraft to Mach 2 demanded 
perfect conditions to be achieved, yet a turbojet engine was already being developed at 
the time of Crossfield’s flight that would make achieving the speed nearly routine.     
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3.0 The General Electric J79 Turbojet Engine 
 
In early 1952, General Electric’s Aircraft Gas Turbine Division (G.E.A.G.T.D.) laid 
out the generic design parameters for a turbojet engine needed to meet future design 
requirements for high levels of supersonic flight. C.W. ‘Jim’ LaPierre who lead the division 
demanded a revolutionary advance in their next major turbojet that would obtain good fuel 
economy at Mach 0.9 with a light weight design, yet had the flexibility, strength, and thrust 
to achieve Mach 2.0 before an aircraft had even achieved the speed30.  Two design groups 
were given the opportunity to study the design requirements with additional considerations 
of cost to manufacture, maintenance, and overall performance. One group utilized a twin 
spool or rotor design that was being used successfully by Pratt & Whitney (P&W) to nearly 
control the turbojet market at the time, and the other group was utilizing a variable stator 
approach.31 Each design offered advantages and disadvantages with little data within G.E. 
for guidance. Dr. Chapman Walker headed the twin rotor team for G.E.’s internal turbojet 
engine competition. A twin rotor or dual spool turbojet employed two central shafts 
operating independently of each other at high and low pressures which provided relatively 
high thrust and low fuel consumption with reduced stall characteristics, but was larger in 
diameter, comparably heavier, and complicated in that the dual spools needed a complex 
set of bearings to operate, and could still require inefficient bleed valves to help control 
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stall issues.32  Gerhard Neumann led the variable stator turbojet team.  The variable stator 
was first tested by Roll-Royce in 1949 for the Avon turbojet concept, but variable inlet 
guide vanes and bleed valves were employed instead due to issues in making the variable 
stators work properly.33  The variable stator turbojet could be lighter and smaller in 
diameter due to utilizing a single shaft, fewer bearings and seals, but suffered from 
leakage of high-pressure air around the base of the adjustable stators.34 After a 
comparison of data from the two teams, the variable stator concept engine was chosen. 
The variable stator turbojet engine concept had offered the best opportunity to 
achieve the earlier design requirements and meet the performance specifications. G.E. 
had been drawn to the possibility of variable stators being developed for jet engines to 
obtain higher flight speeds as early as 1951.35 Gerhard Neumann, with assistance from a 
dozen other engineers at building 29G of the G.E.’s Lynn, Massachusetts facility, designed 
and built a prototype compressor to demonstrate the feasibility of the technology. The tests 
showed a successful operation, and a patent was eventually filed for variable stators in 
Neumann’s name.36  The engine was a fixed fourteen-stage turbojet converted for variable 
action within the first five stages of the stators and the inlet guide vanes (I.G.V.). Typical jet 
engines flowed well within their design region, but at off design points or as low air speeds 	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flowed into the engine, airflow angles and volume misalign with the resultant compressors. 
The vector and quantity of air hitting the compressors could form a low-pressure zone. The 
variable stator system worked to match the pressure and air speed differential directing the 
air to the correct angle of attack for the subsequent compressor stage. The stators could 
pivot and thus vary the air’s trajectory and volume to ensure the air affected the 
compressor vanes at the intended point for maximum air compression and an alleviation of 
stall characteristics. By May 1952, the variable stator experimental engine, code named 
VSXE with the layout drawing nomenclature of X24A within G.E., had concluded testing 
and proven the potential of the technology.37     
Gerhard “Herman the German” Neumann led the team developing the VSXE 
demonstrator turbojet engine. Neumann was born November 8, 1917, in Germany to a 
non-practicing Jewish family, and attended the technical school Ingenieurschule Mittweida 
where he gained experience as an engine mechanic and engineer. In 1938, as the 
prospect of war seemed increasingly likely and with persecution of Jews increasing within 
Germany, Neumann saw an announcement on the school bulletin boards of a German 
Army deferment to assist the Chinese Nationalist government.  The Chinese government 
needed German mechanical engineers, and Neumann accepted a possible position with 
only vague references to a possible location of employment within the interior of China.38 
He would eventually arrive in Hong Kong in June 1939, but did not immediately depart for 
the interior of China due to employment issues. When WWII began in September 1939, 
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the British gathered all German nationals at the La Salle College in Kowloon. The British 
confiscated Neumann’s passport, and just a day before being removed from British 
controlled Hong Kong he meet W. Langhorne Bond of the China National Aviation 
Corporation in an elevator where Neumann explained his plight.39 Bond immediately 
arranged for Neumann to leave Hong Kong without a passport, and before working briefly 
in a Chinese civilian aircraft company, Neumann eventually accepted a position within 
China as a mechanic with the American Volunteer Group, or Flying Tigers. In 1942, he 
was sworn into the U.S.A.A.A.F. and would subsequently twice reconstruct, initially and 
then again due to a landing accident, a captured Mitsubishi A6M Zero, Japan’s dominant 
all-purpose fighter during WWII.40  With the assistance of General Bill Donovan, Neumann 
was granted United States citizenship by an act of Congress in May 1945.41 After the war 
in 1948, Neumann, his wife Clarice, whom he had met on a visit to Washington, D.C., and 
their dog trekked across Asia by Jeep to Israel to travel to the United States where he 
eventually settled in Lynn, Massachusetts, working for G.E. as a test engineer.   
Neumann and G.E. worked to provide a family of three different turbojets utilizing 
variable stators to present to the U.S. Air Force (U.S.A.F.) for future applications.  The 
U.S.A.F. chose the X-24A on December 3, 1952, to have a basic thrust rating of nearly 
14,000 pounds of force; it was given the designation of J79 by the U.S.A.F., and the 
overall project was designated MX2118. The other two engines presented, an advanced 
J73 and engine designation J77, were terminated from further development.42 An 
additional engine, the GOL-1590, was authorized as an engineering demonstrator for 	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design and test data and was known within G.E. as the D-1. Prior to the U.S.A.F. decision 
for the J79, the U.S.A.A.C. had realized by October 1946, it needed to develop a future 
large supersonic aircraft capable of delivering an atomic bomb called Generalized Bomber 
Study (G.E.B.O.). By 1949, the original G.E.B.O. study was concluded and revised for a 
medium bomber.  Convair and Boeing emerged as early contenders, and in 1951, the 
companies were given contracts for aerodynamic and conceptual design studies. After 
several revisions to the design concepts and bomber configurations, Convair was chosen 
to develop the first supersonic bomber, and the U.S.A.F. had the impetus for a supersonic 
jet engine capable of powering the bomber to Mach 2. They turned to G.E. and its new 
turbojet with variable stators to power the aircraft. 
G. E. was now responsible to develop the engine as quickly as possible to power 
future fighter and bomber aircraft within their design phase to secure strategic advantage 
over the Soviet Union. General Donald Putt, commander of Air Research and 
Development, indicated to G.E. that the J79 greatly influenced “to a very major degree, this 
country’s ability to defend itself during the 1958-1965 period” and “this responsibility should 
not be treated lightly.”43 G.E. responded with a management of the program that consisted 
of a team of handpicked engineers, draftsmen, metallurgists, managers, and secretaries, 
and they toiled within a common area to achieve the necessary engineering drawings and 
data for the 12,000 parts that comprised an engine.44  The GOL-1590 engine ran for the 
first time on December 16, 1953, with its inlet painted in the same shark mouth motif as on 
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the Curtis P-40 Warhawks of the Flying Tigers in honor of Gerhard Neumann.45 The 
engine immediately started, increased its speed so quickly within its starting cycle, and 
accelerated so suddenly the test crew lost control of the test engine’s manual variable 
stator controls. The engine vibrated intensely causing a break in the ‘dog-bone’ bracket 
holding the suspended engine, which dropped the front of the engine, and it hit off of the 
test frame. The test engine was damaged, but it had shown promise with its brief but 
astonishing performance. 
The GOL-1590 engine was repaired three weeks later, and tests resumed with test 
personnel and engineers better prepared for the instantaneous starting cycle and rapid 
acceleration characteristics of the engine. The newly built test chamber at the 29G facility, 
which could simulate altitudes from sea level to 60,000 feet, expedited testing of the 
engine and reduced costs.46 The engine exceeded full power within the first eight hours of 
testing, and its overall impressive performance results caused the engineers to doubt and 
double check the instrumentation.47 The first prototype XJ-79 was tested on June 8, 1954, 
achieving its fundamental goals of exceptional supersonic and subsonic performance all 
within a lightweight design. The development milestones of the revolutionary J79 turbojet 
with its use of unproven variable stator technology proceeded at a nearly identical rate as 
another G.E. internally developed engine, the J47-D17, which was an evolution of an 
already existing model requiring only the addition of an afterburner. An afterburner on 
turbojet engines injects fuel to burn aft of the turbine into the exhaust gases to provide 
additional thrust during operational needs such as takeoffs, but at the expense of 	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increased fuel consumption. The original configuration model, the J79-3A, possessed a 
diameter of 38.0 inches, an inlet diameter of 32.0 inches, a length of 204.0 inches, a 
weight class of 3200 pounds, and ingested 162 pounds of air a second through its inlet at 
static sea level conditions.48 By comparison, the J47-D17 had a 1.0 inch larger diameter, a 
2.0 inch larger inlet diameter, was 22.5 inches longer, produced half the thrust at 7500 
pounds of thrust, was capable of half the overall speed class at Mach 1.0, and ingested 61 
fewer pounds of air a second at static sea level.49 G.E. had planned, tested and achieved a 
turbojet engine capable of sustained Mach 2 or greater flight less than a month after Scott 
Crossfield in a Douglas D-558-II Skyrocket powered by a rocket had momentarily achieved 
it under the most ideal situation.  
The autonomous mechanisms controlling the variable stator system supported 
operational performance of the engine over a varying range of conditions without the need 
for pilot control.  The simplicity of the concept belied the complexity of the synchronization 
of the various electro-mechanical mechanisms to achieve the result. A few years earlier 
Rolls Royce had avoided variable stators and concluded other options were easier due to 
the complexity for its Avon turbojet.50 The variable stator system was an organization of 
parts that required harmonious control of their functions to achieve the desired results. A 
predetermined program with input from different sensors measuring engine speed and 
temperature determined the position of the stator. The main fuel control mechanism 
received high-pressure fuel, and housed a variable vane cam that was positioned by the 
inlet temperature and engine speed. This in turn provided a signal to the variable vane 	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scheduling valve, then signaled an actuator to move a set of bellcranks attached to an 
actuating ring and master-rod that moved the bellcranks, and in turn the stators [reference 
Picture 1.0A: General Electric J79-17 Turbojet, Picture 1.0B: Variable Stator Outer Control 
Mechanism (Close-Up), and Picture 1.0C: Variable Stators (View Looking Out). The 
variable stators along the first six stages of the engine controlled the flow of air through the 
engine between approximately 63% and 95% of engine operating speeds within the 
predetermined schedule.51  G.E. had succeeded in facilitating the various mechanisms into 
a harmonious control of the variable stators to achieve the desired results.  
While the variable stators were the key technological advancement of the engine, 
there were also several other key features that succeeded in creating the first Mach 2 
turbojet engine. Due to the requirement of the engine to operate efficiently within sub and 
supersonic speeds, a convergent − divergent ejector type nozzle was chosen to control the 
exhaust. With a convergent – divergent exhaust in the J79, an adjustable mechanical 
linkage could reduce the upstream exhaust as necessary before the divergent section 
could allow the exhaust to expand with secondary air used to apply pressure against the 
mechanisms. This feature helped to speed up the outgoing exhaust to supersonic speeds. 
Conical construction was used when possible in areas such as the main engine frames 
and several different supports. Conical supports provided the required strength and 
support without having to resort to heavier stiffeners or gussets.52 Additionally a conical 
turbine shaft was also employed for the main turbine shaft, which reduced the wall 
thickness and weight, and aided in the swift acceleration characteristics of the aircraft the 
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J79 was installed within. The overall diameter and volume was kept to a minimum with the 
majority of controls and accessories integrated within the forward section of the 
powerplant, which allowed more efficient possible aerodynamics, operation and 
maintenance for its intended application in military aircraft, but would prove a detriment 
when the engine was later converted for commercial usage and a fan was applied to 
increase the fuel economy of the engine.    
The design and manufacture of the J79 utilized a number of different materials due 
to production requirements, cost, and attributes. The single shaft of the J79 only required 
three sets of bearings in the forward, compressor, and turbine frames. The compressor 
blades and stator vanes were manufactured from 403 stainless steel because they offered 
a higher level of corrosion resistance, and a high temperature operating range of up to 
1,300° Fahrenheit.53  Titanium, which would have offered less weight, better fatigue 
resistance, and similar corrosion and temperature operating range, was not used within 
any stage of the blades or stators within the initial J79’s due to G.E.’s previous negative 
experience and cost associated with the material at the time.54 Although discovered in the 
1700’s and used sparingly since then, titanium had only first been used in major airframe 
components within an aircraft in the experimental Douglas X-3 Stiletto that first flew in 
October 1952.55 The engine mounting attach points employed uni-ball and thrust pin 
construction, formed within the frame along the forward section of the engine. They were 	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all made of high strength chromolloy steel, along with various other engine components, 
due to it being stronger than standard steel to control thrust loads, with pads to control 
vibrations, and strut links to control aft side loads. Mounting point usage was controlled by 
the requirements of the particular aircraft.  
Engineering considerations were also given to design simplicity to achieve fewer 
maintenance hours needed to overhaul or repair the engine in service. Straightforward 
designs offered more reliability and ease of operation in service.  The turbine casings were 
divided parallel with the turbine datum to aid inspection of the interior of the turbine.56 The 
design of the compressor section of the engine was devised so the balance of the engine 
could be removed or retained for maintenance, or just the complete removal of the 
compressor from the rest of the engine.57 The single shaft of the J79 with only three 
bearings enabled fewer moving parts, less wear, and greater overall reliability than most of 
its turbojet engine competition.58 Maintainers of the engine could use these features to aid 
in their inspections or repairs as required.  The plumbing for engine airflow extraction was 
internalized to reduce external piping problems of pressurization loss common in the era, 
and provided a more streamlined engine. Engine air flow was extracted for accessory 
power, cooling, cabin pressurization and systems such as boundary layer control, which 
blew air along the surface of wing flight controls to provide extra lift and allowed for 
reduced air speeds during landings, reducing airframe stress as seen in the Lockheed F-	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104 Starfighter.59 These innovations exemplified the forethought of G.E. engineers to 
understand that an uncomplicated design resulted in a more reliable engine, and would 
prove to be advantageous with other aspects for its customers. 
Fewer hours maintaining the engine equaled lower costs to its customers, and the 
aircraft itself was more operationally ready for its sorties due to less down time being 
maintained. Several components were designed for easier maintenance or designed to 
last for prolonged service. Compressor casings were split horizontally upper and lower, 
forward and aft, and designed so that the entire upper or lower section could be removed 
or just one section at any time. Honeycomb seals were employed along the turbine tip 
shrouds, which provided better sealing and metal wear of the shroud seal thus providing 
longer life. Initial maintenance of 2,400 man-hours were undesirable due to inexperienced 
maintenance of the engine as it operated within the first few years of service, and 
preliminary problems found in most innovative technological devices during the first few 
years of usage and development.60  Eventually G.E. resolved the problems, improved 
processes and techniques, and the engine maturity brought the maintenance time between 
overhauls (M.T.B.O) down to a level commensurate or greater than rival American turbojet 
engines. A 1977 Air Force study by the Rand Corporation of the total life cycle costs 
associated with six different turbojet and two turbofan engines showed the J79 M.T.B.O 
was better than all but the J57-P-43, labor rates were the lowest, and while aircraft 
dependent, base maintenance costs per engine flight hour (B.M.C./E.F.H.C.), average time 
to overhaul and depot costs per flying hour were comparable or less than other turbojet or 	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turbofan engines.61 A turbofan is different from a turbojet engine in that a turbofan is more 
contemporary technology and employs a ducted fan to bypass a portion of the air from the 
combustion process through the engine core with both heated and bypass air providing 
thrust. The amount of air bypassing the engine core is referred to as the bypass ratio. 
Typical military fighters employ a low bypass ratio turbofan, while most military transport 
and commercial passenger aircraft use high bypass turbofan engines.  The J79 turbojet 
required an inspection at 600 flight hours, and at 1,200 hours required a depot level 
overhaul, or a specialized inspection and repair at a dedicated facility, which was 
comparable to the other Mach 2 capable turbojet, the P&W J75, and beat early turbofans. 
The ease of maintenance permitted a more efficient operation of the aircraft on the ground 
and in the air. 
The overall size of the J79 aided in its efficient operation within aircraft and 
allowed for improved performance. Compared to its main competition of the time, the P&W 
J57 and later the J75, it weighed well over one thousand pounds less than both models, 
was shorter, smaller in diameter, and easily provided more thrust to weight than either 
model, but a negative feature of the J79 was that it burned slightly more fuel that the two 
P&W engines which would have damaging repercussions when the J79 was converted for 
commercial use. For the design engineer of an aircraft, weight reduction was a key design 
characteristic to achieve the increasing performance requirements of the United States 
Armed Forces. Unnecessary increased weight meant potentially lost performance for the 
aircraft.  Kendall Perkins, Vice-President of Engineering at McDonnell Aircraft Corporation, 
in 1954 for an internal engineering design manual, wrote “Whenever an extra pound is 
added, performance is lost which can never be fully regained,” and “…when we add weight 	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we can’t change the airplane size and power but must accept instead the loss in 
performance which is, almost by definition, equally objectionable.”62 The size of the engine 
also meant that considerations had to be made for other components or items being 
constrained within the airframe. Greater size and weight of the engine meant stronger and 
thicker structures to carry the weight, and the increased size of the engine and structures 
resulted in less room for other items such as fuel tanks within the airframe. A smaller 
diameter engine required less area within the airframe or a more compact nacelle when 
the engine is hung outside of the main airframe, and thus reduced the amount of drag the 
airplane was subjected to within flight.63 All of these features endowed the J79 with the 
necessary characteristics to better its engine competition of the time, and provide military 
aircraft the thrust to potentially exceed Mach 2, continuing the perceived requirement of 
speed to intercept potential threats, or air interdiction quickly into enemy territory to bomb 
targets. 
The J79 engine was in many ways an engineering marvel with all of its 
characteristics and a solid design. In less than ten years after WWII, the fastest piston 
engine aircraft of the war was potentially capable of only around a quarter of the speed of 
the soon to be released aircraft powered by the J79. It attained many of the quality design 
characteristics such as meeting the requirements of the customer, size and efficiency, 
simplicity, reliability, cost and maintainability that G.E. aspired to achieve in its original 
turbojet proposal. G.E. needed to prove these characteristics and qualify the engine for 
aircraft usage.   	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Before the engine could be released for full rate production of the engine, flight-
testing beyond a wind tunnel was required all while management within G.E. was 
changing.  A specially designed North American B-45 Tornado was fitted with the J79 into 
its bomb bay, and on May 20, 1955, from the Schenectady, New York facility, the four J47 
engines on the B-45 were shut down and the single J79 was lowered from the bomb bay 
and powered the aircraft. The engine was subjected to a fifty-hour qualification testing over 
the next few months.  Later in December of the same year, Roy Pryor piloted a Douglas 
XF4D Skyray from Edwards Air Force Base (A.F.B.) with its Westinghouse J40 replaced by 
a J79 for flight-testing.64 During this time, the former project manager of the J47 turbojet 
who had co-developed an anti-icing system for jet engines, Neil Burgess, replaced the 
original project manager, Perry Egbert, due to health reasons.65 Burgess and Bernhard 
Neumann were the two individuals within G.E. most closely associated with the 
development and success of the J79 over its production life.66 Back in January 1953, just 
after the J79 project was officially established, J79 project leaders including Neumann met 
with officials at Convair in Fort Worth, Texas, to discuss application of the J79 in Convair’s 
proposal for the Air Force MX-1964 bomber project.67 The proposal would eventually 
become the Convair B-58 Hustler, but it would not be the first application of the J79 into a 
military aircraft.  
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3.1 The Lockheed F-104 Starfighter 
 
The J79 turbojet was first fitted into the Lockheed F-104 Starfighter for the 
U.S.A.F., but the aircraft was not what the U.S.A.F. requested or envisioned. Kelly 
Johnson had interviewed pilots to understand what attributes they needed in aircraft to 
combat their Cold War adversaries on an exploratory visit to see how Lockheed aircraft 
were performing during the Korean War.68 All pilots agreed they needed greater speed and 
altitude to defeat their opponents. Korean War era U.S.A.F. pilots flew out-matched F-80 
Shooting Stars until the introduction of the North American F-86 Sabre, which only proved 
an equal to the MiG-15.69  
Hal Hibbard and Kelly Johnson went back to their Advanced Development 
Projections Section of Lockheed or “Skunk Works” group and designed an uncomplicated, 
lightweight interceptor aircraft, even though there was no U.S.A.F. contractual requirement 
for an aircraft of this type at the time.70 Relying heavily on N.A.C.A. data from the Douglas 
X-3 Stiletto, Hibbard and Johnson designed the smallest, most aerodynamically efficient 
airframe of the time around a single engine with relatively straight, razor thin wings to 
reduce drag, and a high “T-Tail.” The trapezoidal shaped wings measured just 7.5 feet 
long and only 4.2 inches thick at the inboard most section mating to the fuselage, tapering 
to less than 2.0 inches at the outboard tips, and were a departure from the prevailing 
swept back wing philosophy of the time to obtain supersonic speeds. The fuel, landing 	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gears, and most controls had to be installed in the fuselage with only one-inch thick 
hydraulic cylinders to actuate the control surfaces within the thin wings. Testing to evaluate 
possible outboard wing tip designs was performed using scaled models launched by 
rockets to verify if the wing structure could withstand various configurations. The results 
and conclusions from the testing developed into a controversial proposal and subsequent 
aircraft over its entire service life. 
The proposal brought to the U.S.A.F. was well received by the service, and forced 
an open competition amongst several of the leading aircraft companies. General Donald 
Putt, head of the U.S.A.F. Systems Command, issued Weapons System General 
Operational Requirement 303A for an air superiority day fighter that needed a high climb 
rate, speed, and altitude to supplement and eventually replace the North American F-100 
Super Sabre.71 Republic, Northrop, and North American also offered submittals for the 
requirement. Lockheed’s proposal, Model 83, was smaller, with a potential for a high 
thrust-to-weight ratio for advantageous speed and climb rates, and possessed about half 
the weight of the other proposals.72 In January 1953, Lockheed’s submittal was the winner 
of the competition, and by March the U.S.A.F. issued a contract for two prototypes to be 
flown the following year, but there was still a major decision to be made concerning which 
engine would power the aircraft.  
Several engine manufacturers had engines available or were in the process of 
being readied that promised high thrust and the potential for a speed exceeding Mach 1. 
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P&W promised the yet to be available large and powerful J75; Allison offered the older 
J71; and G.E. offered the J79, but it was not thought to be available until 1956.73 
Consequently, the F-104 Starfighter was originally designed to be tested with the license 
built Wright Aeronautical J65-W-6, non-afterburning, and J65-W-7, with afterburner, which 
were built from British Armstrong-Siddeley Sapphire axial-flow turbojets, but the J79 was 
chosen to power the production aircraft. Lockheed had to design two different aircraft at 
certain sections due to the two engines different sizes, weight distribution, and their air 
inlets and exhaust outlets differing needs. By January 1954, two XF-104’s were flown to 
Edwards A.F.B., aircraft 53-7786 for aerodynamic evaluation and 53-7787 for armament 
tests. Aircraft 786 revealed landing gear issues which required a redesign before returning 
to flight tests, and aircraft 53-7787 flew to the highest speed achieved with a J65 powered 
XF-104 when Lockheed test pilot Ray Goudey flew the aircraft to Mach 1.79 on March 25, 
1955, before its eventual loss in April of 1955 when a bullet casing ejected from the G.E. 
M61 30mm Vulcan gun caused explosive decompression.74 Despite efforts to achieve a 
higher speed in the 250 hours of flight testing performed with the J65 powered XF-104, it 
had yet to achieve the intended maximum speed of the aircraft.75  Flight-testing would 
continue with the envisioned engine and greater speed would be achieved. 
The U.S.A.F. issued a new contract in March 1955 for seventeen YF-104 
Starfighters equipped with early configurations of the G.E. J79 for further testing. Lockheed 
had promised Mach 2 performance from its aircraft and they hoped to achieve the goal as 	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they tested J79-GE-3, -3A and -3B versions of the engine. The YF-104’s were also 
redesigned with additional fuel cells, a revised horizontal flight surface on the vertical tail, 
and a revised nose, besides the changes needed for the basic geometry of the J79.76 G.E. 
delivered its first engine to Lockheed at the end of December 1955, and it flew over a 
month later in February 1956 ahead of the USAF contract. Just over two months later on 
April 27, 1956, the F-104 flew to Mach 2.13 at a level altitude making it the U.S.A.F.’s first 
aircraft to achieve the feat.77 The U.S.A.F. placed an additional order of 722 F-104’s, but 
eventually acquired only 294 of the aircraft, which were sent to different commands with 
the first being sent to the 83rd Fighter/Interceptor Wing based at Hamilton A.F.B. in 
California.78 The F-104 Starfighter’s high speed and rate of climb at that location potentially 
allowed it to intercept the perceived threat of bombers approaching the West Coast from 
Soviet bases along its eastern border. The Soviet Union had developed long range 
Tupolev Tu-95 Bear and Myasishchev M-04 Bison capable of carrying long-range 
intercontinental ballistic missiles by this time, and the F-104 could provide a deterrence to 
quickly intercept the bombers at elevated altitudes.79 Based on the success of the aircraft 
and its astonishing achievements, the U.S.A.F. and the industry team of Lockheed with 
Kelly Johnson, and G.E. with Neil Burgess and Gerhard Neumann, won the 1958 Collier 
Trophy, awarded annually to the individual or group accomplishing the greatest 	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achievement in aerospace.  Lockheed had achieved its original goal of a lightweight fighter 
for the U.S.A.F., but concerns over the overall performance of the aircraft remained. 
Due in part to its design for overall speed, the F-104 Starfighter was limited in its 
operational capabilities compared to its contemporaries. Its short and slender wings limited 
its ability to carry ordinance or fuel, which proved highly disadvantageous to strategic 
planners within the U.S.A.F. When it used just its internal fuel load, the F-104’s had limited 
range for its intended intercept role, which meant if a F-104 was to reach a bomber target 
at an altitude of 45,000 feet, it would practically have to do so over its base.80 The original 
requirement of being a day fighter proved to be detrimental when more adaptable all-
weather aircraft were in service. Its slender nose allowed installation of only a small radar 
with a very limited radar range of ten miles in clear conditions.81  In order for it to be more 
capable and carry nuclear ordinance, the F-104 had to employ a trapeze type mechanism 
exposed to the airstream along the fuselage centerline.82 The problems with the F-104 
were due to its raison d’être: it was lightweight with thin, small wings built for speed and to 
reach extreme altitudes as quickly as possible. It was also not very maneuverable, as its 
thin and small flight controls did not allow the aircraft an acceptable turn rate. Test pilot 
Milton O. Thompson concluded the F-104 “was designed only to get to high altitude fast 
and pass by the enemy at high enough speed to avoid a dogfight and a retaliatory missile. 
It was never intended to be a dogfighter; instead, it was a greyhound.”83  Just like a 
greyhound, it was built for ultimate speed as the J79 propelled the F-104 to speed and 
altitude records, and was the first aircraft to hold both records.  	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The thrust of the J79 and its nearly singular purpose design propelled the F-104 
Starfighter to its records, and as a result gave it some of its nicknames and reputation. On 
May 7, 1958, a YF-104 piloted by U.S.A.F. Major Howard C. Johnson surpassed the world 
altitude record with a record of 91,243 feet, and less than two weeks later Captain Walter 
W. Irwin achieved a speed record of 1404.09 mph becoming the first aircraft to hold both 
altitude and speed records.84  On December 14, 1959, a F-104C model flown by U.S.A.F 
Captain Joe Jordan, in an inter-service rivalry, flew to 103,389 feet, and captured the 
altitude record from a Navy prototype YF4H-1 powered by a J79 set a week earlier.85 After 
having already beaten multiple speed to altitude records, it established the speed to 
altitude record for 100,000 feet with a time of five minutes and 4.92 seconds on the same 
flight by Jordan.86 It was built for speed and it looked the part. It was sleek and futuristic 
compared to propeller planes of less than a decade before and signified the jet age of the 
1950’s. It also earned an array of nicknames. The positive nicknames focused around it 
speed such as “zipper,” “Zip-4,” or “missile with a man in it,” but it also earned less than 
flattering monikers due to it high accident rates such as “widow-maker”, “ground nail”, or 
“flying coffin.”87 Unfortunately for Lockheed, most of the derogatory nicknames originated 
from N.A.T.O. countries that acquired the F-104 Starfighter. 
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The F-104 Starfighter was sold to other countries with varying consequences for 
Lockheed and G.E. Both companies embraced offset or coproduction work packages in 
which a portion of the manufacturing was performed in the country buying the aircraft or 
engine, which enticed companies to buy the products. After West Germany was permitted 
to join N.A.T.O. in 1956, it was also allowed to rebuild its air force, the Bundesluftwaffe, 
after it had been terminated following the end of WWII. While some German industries had 
recovered since the end of WWII, the aircraft industry had not due to strict postwar controls 
so that by the mid-1950’s it lacked the expertise to design and build a suitable competitive 
aircraft. The West German government looked to procure a foreign aircraft, and the 
purchase would be its first postwar acquisition of aircraft. The entirely new force needed to 
assist in the defense of Western Europe, so the potentially lucrative deal meant multiple 
aircraft entries into the competition.  
Being the “frontline” of N.A.T.O. against Warsaw Pact countries meant West 
Germany required an aircraft that could reach the necessary altitude quickly to intercept 
potential adversaries, but it did not require the range or payload to reach deep into the 
Soviet Union which would potentially incite and cause political provocation.88 The West 
Germans considered the French Dassault Mirage III, the British English Electric Lightning, 
and the United States Grumman F11F-1F powered by a J79, but the Lockheed F-104 won 
the competition.  Other countries within N.A.T.O. such as Belgium, Canada, the 
Netherlands, Italy, and Japan acquired and license built the F-104, with all but the 
Netherlands doing the same with the J79. These N.A.T.O. countries understood the 
advantages of standardization both militarily and financially, and the intellectual, political, 	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and economic benefits of gaining even limited production rights to the aircrafts and 
engines. G.E. supported the manufacture of the J79 in these N.A.T.O. countries with 
engineering assistance and utilizing the existing supply base.  Denmark, Greece, Jordan, 
Norway, Pakistan, and Turkey also acquired the F-104 either through direct purchase or 
else they were given former U.S.A.F. F-104’s. 
While the F-104 Starfighter had a long production life and was sold to many 
countries, it was a controversial aircraft for Lockheed. The nicknames “Flying Coffin” or 
“Widow-Maker” were due to its high accident rate, especially in West Germany where 
government and military officials openly questioned the decision to procure the airplane. 
West German Lt. General Werner Panitzki, claimed the decision to buy the F-104 was 
based on political motives, and the issues surrounding the F-104 were due to multiple 
factors including insufficient pilot training and flight experience.89 Lockheed faced criticism 
over the sales of the F-104 in the 1970’s when it was revealed Lockheed employees had 
paid key government officials in West Germany, Japan, and the Netherlands to select the 
F-104 over its competition.90 G.E. was never implicated in the bribery scandal, but it did 
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3.2 The Convair B-58 Hustler 
 
The F-104 Starfighter was the first aircraft to be propelled by the J79 in flight as it 
beat another U.S.A.F. Mach 2 aircraft powered by the J79 into the air by less than a year. 
The Convair B-58 Hustler was the U.S.A.F.’s first bomber capable of speeds in excess of 
Mach 2, and it first flew in November 1956. The U.S.A.F. originally conceived of a medium-
sized bomber to replace the Boeing B-47 Stratojet in 1949, and later refined the 
requirements for high altitude flight at Mach 2 to fly faster than air defenses could intercept 
the conceptual aircraft for its MX-1626 program.91 The announcement of the program and 
its high priority were made just weeks after the Soviet Union had shown its own swept 
wing bomber powered by four turbojets with potential long range capability at its May Day 
display in Moscow in 1954, and the U.S.A.F. hoped to counter the perceived threat.92 With 
inflight refueling, the bomber was expected to penetrate enemy air defenses at supersonic 
speeds, drop its nuclear payload, and return. 
Convair was awarded the contract over entries by Boeing and Douglas to design 
and provide total program management of the bomber. Convair engineers had developed 
the concept of the delta wing for supersonic aircraft with the assistance of German 
engineer Alexander Lippisch, who had developed tailless aircraft for Germany during 
WWII.93 Convair also learned from the aerodynamic issues of their F-102 Delta Dagger, 
whose original design had initially failed to reach its designed altitude, and was incapable 	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of reaching Mach 1. Convair designed a full delta winged medium sized bomber with four 
J79 engines hung from separate pylons under the wing, a central pylon under the fuselage 
to house fuel and nuclear weapons, and a Whitcomb area ruled fuselage.94 Named after 
Richard Whitcomb of N.A.S.A., the fuselage is pinched perpendicular to the surface of the 
wings to reduce buffeting and drag during high-speed flights. Convair studied multiple 
placements of the engine and designs before they settled on a production version that 
entered service in November 1959.  
The design of the B-58 Hustler featured a number of advanced features, and these 
characteristics and the attributes of the J79 assisted in its revolutionary capabilities. Due to 
the high-speed capability of the B-58, the aircraft was one of the first to employ aluminum 
and stainless steel honeycomb core bonding which helped to dissipate heat, reduced 
weight and smoothed the outer surface contour due to the resultant reduction of fasteners 
needed. Even with the honeycomb panels, the skin temperature limited the top speed as 
heat built up due to the friction of the air, but ample thrust remained to propel the bomber 
to greater speeds.95 An ejection pod was developed in case the aircrew were forced to 
eject at supersonic speeds at extremely low altitude due to an accident during mission 
evaluation testing.96 Variable conical inlets forward of the J79’s were employed to ensure 
the transonic air shockwaves above Mach 1.5 still provided the optimum air flow into the 
engine, and they helped decrease the radar signature of the B-58 to reduce detection by 
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enemy radar.97 Due to the conical inlet and the overall shape of the B-58 with its smooth 
outer contours, Nike anti-aircraft missile site radar operators routinely had to request B-58 
pilots to “show themselves” by climbing to a higher altitude where lower altitude clutter and 
the reduced radar signature of the B-58 obscured it being located.98 The streamlined outer 
mold line and the thrust of the J79’s enabled a top speed exceeding Mach 2, and an 
excellent rate of climb even when carrying a bombing load. The J79’s in the B-58 were 
capable of providing up to 107% thrust for five seconds or 104% for slightly longer intervals 
if operational conditions were warranted.99 Faster than a .45 caliber bullet, which was 
astonishing for a bomber, the B-58 powered by J79’s set multiple speed records and 
acquired several awards. It set fourteen world speed records; won the Bleriot Trophy for 
being the first aircraft to average over 1,242.74 mph for at least thirty minutes, the Mackay 
Trophy awarded by the U.S.A.F. Chief of Staff for a B-58 flying from Carson A.F.B. to Paris 
in five hours and fifty-five minutes, the Thompson Trophy for averaging 1,284.73 mph in a 
twenty-nine minute flight between Washington, D.C. and Chicago while carrying a payload; 
the 1962 Bendix Trophy for flying from Los Angeles to New York at 1,214.65 mph in two 
hours and fifteen minutes; and the 1961 Harmon Trophy to William R. Payne piloting a B-
58 for “outstanding and extraordinary feats of individual piloting skill.” 100 While speed 
records and awards garnered pride, swagger and publicity for G.E., Convair, and the 
U.S.A.F., it did not secure the B-58 an extended service life. 
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  Despite its prodigious speed capability over the U.S.A.F.’s other bombers within 
service during the 1960’s (reference Graph 3.2A: U.S. Bomber Maximum Speed Capability 
Historical Perspective), the B-58 was retired due to issues with the aircraft itself and with 
changing Armed Forces strategies. Even though global reach meant global power and 
speed meant survivability, one of the most negative factors surrounding the weapon 
system was the B-58’s were expensive. Before the bomber even reached operational 
status, President Eisenhower in 1959, had declared the B-58 cost more than its weight in 
gold.101 Only 116 aircraft were ever manufactured for a program that cost over three billion 
dollars. It was also expensive to maintain. The AN/ASQ-42 navigation/bombing system 
possessed a complicated wiring schematic to connect sensor and radar subsystems 
throughout the aircraft, which made it difficult to repair, and general maintenance could 
require the entire airplane be placed in a tooling jig to prevent aircraft distortion.102 Convair, 
aware of its high per unit cost, made a number of proposals: B-58B and B-58C variants, a 
“Kingfish” edition in a design competition with the Lockheed A-12, a B-58 that potentially 
could exceed 90,000 feet with a parasite aircraft attached to extend its range, and a 
commercial version in hopes of maintaining production and amortizing costs.103 B-58’s also 
suffered from a high attrition rate due to landing gear issues, hard landings, and general 
loss of control due to the flight characteristics associated with the delta wing configuration, 
which required higher take-off and landing speeds.104 
Costs and capabilities aside, the B-58 was under development when the Soviet 
Union launched Sputnik into orbit, and it came into service at the same time a Soviet Union 	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surface-to-air missile (S.A.M.) had just downed the high altitude Lockheed U-2 spy aircraft. 
Rockets with a nuclear warhead seemed destined to be the cheaper and less risky 
alternative to the manned bomber. S.A.M. site radars easily recognized high altitude flights 
and missiles could intercept the bombers, which limited the missions for the B-58. While 
the B-58 could potentially operate at lower altitudes to evade radar, it had not truly been 
designed for multiple mission, sustained low-level interdiction, and its speed and range 
were reduced while fuel consumption increased due to higher aerodynamic drag at low 
altitudes.105 The wings were never designed for these missions and would have required 
higher costs to maintain.106 The B-58 was never popular with U.S.A.F. General and Chief 
of Staff, Curtis Lemay, for its size and range, and with the advent of intercontinental 
ballistic missiles, the overall cost and risk of manned bombers appeared to make them 
obsolete.107 Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, who never believed in the 
importance of the bomber either, announced in December 1965, the B-58 would be 
phased out by 1970.108 The U.S.A.F. did not give up on the high altitude, Mach 2 plus 
bomber concept, and proposed another high altitude Mach 2 bomber again in the 1970’s in 
the Rockwell B-1 Lancer before it too was cancelled, and redesigned as a low level 
penetration bomber that could withstand the increased aerodynamic loads of low altitude 
flights by just flying over the speed of sound. While the U.S.A.F. was finished with high 
altitude, Mach 2 plus bombers, it was not finished with aircraft powered by the J79 as the 	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3.3 The Grumman F11F-1F Super Tiger 
 
The U.S.A.F. would accept and fly a United States Navy (U.S.N.) aircraft powered 
by the J79 in the McDonnell F-4 Phantom II, but first the U.S.N. would test the engine on 
another aircraft.109 The Grumman F11F-1 Tiger, later designated the F-11, was a U.S.N. 
single seat jet fighter developed in the early 1950’s and was capable of just over the speed 
of sound powered by a license built Curtiss-Wright J65 turbojet. The F11F employed left 
and right engine air inlets parallel to the single pilot, mid-mounted swept wings with full 
length leading edges, trailing edge flaps and swept horizontal stabilizers for additional 
control to land on carriers. The U.S.N. acrobatic demonstrator flight squadron, the Blue 
Angels, used it from 1957 until 1969.  Already having issues with the performance and 
engine availability of the Wright J65, the U.S.N. accepted Grumman’s proposal to adopt 
the J79 into the last two production Tigers for flight tests with the new designation of F11F-
1F Super Tiger. The U.S.N. believed it would gain experience with the new engine, and 
Grumman hoped to parlay the Super Tiger into further sales.110 The installation of the J79 
required modifications to the aircraft structure surrounding the engine, larger engine inlet 
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ducts, and wing leading edge extensions.111 After initial test flights, the J79 powered F11F-
1F Super Tiger became the first U.S.N. aircraft to exceed Mach 2, which far exceeded 
Grumman test engineering expectations, and on April 16, 1958, it temporarily set the 
altitude record of 76,928 feet.112  The speed and altitude of the J79 powered Super Tiger 
far exceeded the regular J65 powered Tigers with only minor modifications to the platform. 
The U.S.N. did not order additional Super Tigers, and even though it appeared to be the 
favorite for several countries within aircraft competitions, it was ultimately never chosen, 
and only the two were ever produced. The F11F-1F Super Tiger was capable of Mach 2 
performance, but it lacked the capability to carry heavy armament, and especially nuclear 
weapons, so it never saw service beyond a demonstrator.  
 
 
3.4 The McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom II 
 
  The next U.S.N. aircraft to be powered by the J79 was one of the most versatile 
aircraft produced, was also flown by the U.S.A.F., the United States Marine Corps 
(U.S.M.C.), and multiple nations, but it had an inauspicious inception. In 1953, McDonnell 
Aircraft Corporation (M.A.C.) lost the U.S.N. fighter competition to the Chance-Vought F8U 
Crusader, and the future of the company appeared grim.113 M.A.C. began as an aircraft 
parts supplier in 1939, and by 1945 it had developed the U.S.N.’s first jet powered carrier 	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based aircraft in the FH-1 Phantom. It had built over a thousand various U.S.N. aircraft, but 
lacked a future naval production contract so it was seeking to extend the manufacturing life 
of its F3H-H Demon. From its advanced design cage, an office cubicle surrounded by 
chicken wire, a group of six engineers created multiple designs that were designated 
Model 98A through Model 98D. The respective projects were to be powered by two Wright 
J65’s or J67’s capable of Mach 1.52 to Mach 1.69, or J79’s capable of Mach 1.97.  
M.A.C. sought input from various naval operating commands for ideas of 
requirements for the next carrier based aircraft, built a mock-up aircraft based off of the 
Model 98B, and requested an assessment of it by naval commanders.114 Without a firm 
proposal, but encouraged by the Bureau of Aeronautics (BuAer), James S. McDonnell, the 
company founder, submitted a proposal for a twin engine, single seat, all-weather attack 
aircraft in 1954. Designated the AH-1, it lacked a mission, and thus a viable reason for 
further development despite an order for two prototypes. Meeting in St. Louis in April 1955, 
within two hours two Chief of Naval Operations officers (C.N.O.) and two BuAer officers 
created a mission for a new aircraft: an aircraft for the carrier fleet defense, that would 
utilize air-to-air missiles without guns to strike potential Soviet Union fighters or bombers 
before they could bomb the carrier and associated task group, cruise and loiter at a two 
hundred fifty mile radius from the carrier fleet, and be capable of returning to flight within 
three hours of landing.115 The requirements had almost been set, but M.A.C. was still not 
assured of building the aircraft. 
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 With the continued assistance from the BuAer and C.N.O., the design was remade 
for two crewmen, the front position for the pilot and the rear for the radar intercept officer 
(R.I.O.), and in 1955, a fly-off competition was set. Chance-Vought was invited to submit 
an aircraft meeting the same requirements, and submitted the F8U-3 Crusader III, an 
evolution of the original F8U Crusader. Utilizing a single P&W J75 engine and flown by a 
single pilot without a R.I.O., the F8U-3 was a fast and maneuverable fighter, but it lost to 
the now F4H-1 due to the latter’s larger payload, the R.I.O. who could handle radar and 
missile firings, the dual engines, and its ability to perform multiple missions.116 Even if 
unintentional, a singular purpose aircraft had lost to the multipurpose capabilities of an 
aircraft adept at defense of the fleet, air-to-air and air to ground attacks, and extending the 
bombing range of the fleet. The U.S.N. also had it first Mach 2 aircraft, and had 
accomplished it by achieving over 75% of its contract requirements (reference Table 3.4A: 
F-4A Phantom II Requirements).117  Following M.A.C.’s previous supernatural derived 
designations, the F4H-1 was given the official name of Phantom II on July 3, 1959, the 20th 
anniversary of the founding of the company. It would not be the last nickname of the 
aircraft, and the F4H-1 was re-classified as the F-4 when the Armed Forces restructured 
their naming convention.118  
 The F-4 Phantom II was not considered aesthetically pleasing, but it was still a 
very proficient, record breaking aircraft while still being able to perform multiple missions 
for numerous armed forces.  The F-4 was a relatively large, twin engine, tandem seat 	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aircraft with large, rectangular variable intakes, area ruled fuselage, swept wings with 
sawtooth leading edges and positive dihedral outboard folding wings, negative dihedral 
horizontal tailplane aft of the engine exhaust that terminate near the water-line of the wing, 
and a single, short vertical to fit within carriers. It employed boundary layer control for the 
leading edges and trailing edge flaps to improve low air speed flight characteristics and 
improve stall speeds with air bleed from the seventeenth stage of the J79, and nine hard 
points for armament or fuel, including semi-submerged points along the bottom of the 
fuselage for the air-to-air, semi-active guided Sparrow missiles being developed at the 
time. Due to its stature and physique, the F-4 was considered a “heavy slugger” that 
gained multiple nicknames, some of which were less than appealing, besides its official 
designation of Phantom II.119 The F-4 earned monikers such as the Rhino, Flying Anvil, 
Double Ugly, Big Ugly, Flying Footlocker, Lead Sled, St. Louis Slugger, and the Spook, 
which was the wide-brimmed-hat wearing, faceless, caped unofficial mascot of the 
Phantom II that adorned everything from squadron patches to promotional or inspirational 
posters within the M.A.C. factory buildings.120  
Despite its looks and questionable aerodynamic qualities, the U.S.N. decided to 
demonstrate the performance of its new aircraft by using it to break flight records. The F-4 
to set or surpassed fifteen records from 1959 through 1962 (reference Table 3.4B: F-4 
World and Class Records Set), including a record speed run of Mach 2.5 by Lieutenant 	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Colonel Robert B. Robinson on November 22, 1961, in a modified, but still capable of 
greater speed, F-4.121 It also won the 1961 Bendix Trophy when Lieutenant Richard 
Gordon flew across the continental U.S. by flying from Ontario, California, to New York City 
in two hours forty-seven minutes averaging 869.7 mph.122 The exploits of the F-4 drew the 
attention of other U.S. services and other nations to the potential of the aircraft.  
 As the Phantom started to break records, the Department of Defense took notice 
of the potential of the aircraft for other services. The U.S.A.F. conducted Operation 
Highspeed as a tactical fighter evaluation between the Convair F-106 Delta Dart and the F-
4 to replace its fleet of F-100 Super Sabres, F-101 Voodoos, F-102 Delta Daggers, and F-
104 Starfighters. Even though the F-4 was developed as fleet interceptor, it123 bettered the 
F-106 in multiple parameters including high and low altitude top speed, climb rate, and it 
could carry up to twenty-two 500 pound bombs to the Delta Dart’s zero.124 While neither 
aircraft was a true tactical fighter, the F-4’s strongest asset lay in its versatility and with the 
engines in that it possessed “more raw power than any previous fighter could muster. With 
more than seven times the thrust of the F-86A, the F4H-1 could take full advantage of its 
load-carrying performance and turn its apparent disadvantages into war-winning fighter-
bomber qualities.”125 The U.S.A.F. Phantom was initially assigned the alphanumeric 
designation of F-4C because it received a number of modifications including a change to 	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the refueling system from the U.S.N.’s hose and drogue to the flying boom system, flight 
controls for the Weapons System Operator (W.S.O.) in the rear seat, a cartridge starter for 
the J79’s, and larger tires that necessitated a redesign to the wheel wells which caused 
protruding contours near the upper wing roots. The U.S.A.F. would acquire the greatest 
quantity of F-4’s and utilize the Phantoms as tactical fighter-bombers in the 1960’s as an 
ideological shift occurred from the need for a high altitude bomber-interceptor to close air 
support and dogfighter against MiG-17 Frescoes, MiG-19 Farmers, and MiG-21 Fishbeds 
during the Vietnam War. 
 The final U.S. Armed Service to acquire the F-4 was the U.S.M.C., and as a 
branch of the U.S.N., it had been closely involved with the development of the F-4 from the 
beginning. The U.S.N. along with the U.S.M.C. received the first twenty-four production F-
4’s and shared initial transition training and evaluation. While the U.S.M.C. had traditionally 
received older or unacceptable U.S.N. aircraft for carrier operations, such as the Vought 
F4U Corsair and the Grumman F7F Tigercat, the Marines received their own production F-
4B’s for operations beginning in August 1962.126 The Marines finally had an aircraft 
envisioned for carrier operations capable of exceeding Mach 2, and carrying over 22,000 
pounds of ordinance. The U.S.M.C.’s primary focus for aircraft was providing support for its 
land forces including all-weather, close air support, attack of targets, reconnaissance, yet 
still able to defend itself and defeat enemy aircraft. The U.S.M.C. also adapted a U.S.A.F. 
RF-4C Phantom II that was an all-weather tactical reconnaissance aircraft with specialized 
cameras and side-looking airborne radars (S.L.A.R.) as the RF-4B for use in a similar 
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role.127 These various models of the F-4 would serve with the U.S.M.C. and its reserve 
units for nearly thirty years.  
 The F-4 Phantom was also sold to multiple countries in numerous different 
configurations, and the first country to acquire the F-4 was the United Kingdom (U.K.). The 
British acquired their own version of the Phantom II for the Royal Navy, the F-4K (British 
internal designation Phantom FG.1), and the Royal Air Force, the F-4M (British internal 
designation Phantom FGR.2), but the U.K. mandated the replacement of J79’s with the 
larger and recently developed Rolls-Royce Spey turbofan engines to aid its own jet engine 
industry.  Due to the larger size of the Spey engines, the aft section of the fuselage was 
redesigned along with the air intakes for British Phantom II’s, and due to the needed 
redesign of parts and smaller production run, the British Phantoms cost twice as much as 
a comparable U.S.N./U.S.M.C. F-4J.128 Despite the Spey’s increased thrust of 20,515 
pounds in afterburner, the J79 equipped F-4’s had a higher operational altitude, larger 
combat radius, and higher maximum speed.129 After the Falkland War, in which Argentina 
and the U.K. fought over the Falkland, South Georgia, and South Sandwich Islands in the 
South Atlantic in 1982, the British acquired surplus U.S.N. F-4J’s to be stationed at the 
Falkland Islands. Those Phantom II’s retained their J79’s, which were deemed to have a 
more immediate response to pilot inputs for speed than the F-4’s with Spey engines.130 
The British Phantoms stationed in the Falklands were just a deterrent and never saw 
combat, but other Phantoms outside the U.S. were operated in combat. 	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 The Israeli Defense Force Air Force (I.D.F./A.F.) acquired the most F-4 Phantom 
II’s outside of the U.S. and saw numerous combat engagements. The I.D.F/A.F. acquired 
F-4E’s, which had been redesigned to finally resolve a tactical inadequacy by adding an 
internal M61 Vulcan cannon for dogfights. Nicknamed the Kurnass or Sledgehammer, 
Israel acquired F-4’s through the “Peace Echo” program and its multiple subsequent 
variant programs. The I.D.F./A.F. employed the F-4 in multiple conflicts until 2004, being 
utilized foremost as ground attack, but it still ranked second to the Dassault Mirage III in 
kills.131 The I.D.F./A.F. also acquired RF-4E reconnaissance Phantom II’s, but due to the 
introduction of the MiG-25 Foxbat and its Mach 2.5 plus capabilities, it desired a faster 
reconnaissance/interceptor. The I.D.F./A.F. initiated the F-4X program in the mid 1970’s, in 
which a modified F-4 with larger air inlets, modified flight controls, and pre-compressor 
cooling using water injection for the J79’s, could increase thrust enough to propel the 
“Sledgehammer” to Mach 3.2.132 The program was never completed due to technical 
issues and concerns that a F-4 could achieve speeds exceeding Mach 3 may reduce or 
cut funding of the U.S.A.F.’s new air superiority fighter, the McDonnell Douglas F-15 
Eagle.133  Even though more modern turbofan engines had been introduced and were 
utilized in multiple aircraft platforms at the time, the J79 was still seen as being capable of 
achieving the desired speed of the F-4X program. Israel was not the only country to 
attempt to upgrade or maintain its fleet of F-4 for years as other countries realized the F-4 	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with modernization packages could remain a successful aircraft even fifty years after its 
introduction.  
 The F-4 Phantom II was sold to eleven different countries outside the U.S. and 
over five thousand were manufactured. This was all the more remarkable given that the 
aircraft was originally designed for carrier usage, so components were more robust due to 
being designed for the increased strain of carrier landings and thus heavier than a 
traditional aircraft. Besides the versatility and load carrying capabilities of the Phantom II, 
its greatest strength laid in the J79 engines. The F-4 had not been designed for dogfights, 
and it lacked the maneuverability to turn in the horizontal plane with the various MiG’s 
during the Vietnam War. Its size, weight, and possible mission to carry bombing loads 
further exacerbated its dogfighting deficiencies. The F-4’s advantage was found in the 
thrust the J79 provided where its propulsion and speed gave it superiority in the vertical 
plane. Ultimate top speed was not always needed in a dogfight, but the versatility of the 
J79 to provide instant acceleration and the force to propel Phantom II’s to acquire the 
energy needed for rolling vertical movements was an effective technique against the MiG’s 
greater turning ability.134 U.S.N. pilot Guy Freeborn noted the J79’s in the Phantom II were 
its “biggest asset, particularly in situations where the aircraft’s handling characteristics 
were pushed to its limits.”135 The F-4’s tactical flexibility was a change to its original fleet 
interceptor mission of obtaining high altitude quickly in order to fire a missile at an 
incoming bomber, and the J79 showed it was adaptable to the requirements of the F-4’s 
other missions of both overall top speed and instant thrust throughout multiple flight 
envelopes and missions without stalling.  	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 The most visible drawback for the F-4 that brought unwanted attention to itself at 
the most inopportune time originated from the J79.  Like most U.S. turbojets, aircraft 
employing the J79 were exposed by over a twenty mile long smoke trail that could reveal 
the aircraft’s position to its adversaries.136 The largest quantity of smoke usually occurred 
during military power cruise settings, but was diminished with use of the afterburner. The 
smoke trail became such a well-known situation for F-4 Phantoms, that the journal for the 
F-4 Phantom II Society is titled Smoke Trails after the condition. G.E., the U.S.N., and the 
U.S.A.F. invested in studies to alleviate or eliminate the smoke trails emitted from the 
engine.  A Smoke Abatement system that injected an additive into the combustion 
chamber was added to some F-4’s over Vietnam, but this was not very practical due to its 
required manual operation and the associated loss of engine efficiency. An improved 
solution was finally obtained with a later J79 engine configuration, but most pilots who flew 
the F-4 had to accept and deal with the exposing smoke trail. The smoke trail may have 
disclosed the position of the F-4, but the J79 provided the power to perform a variety of 
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3.5 The North American A-5 and RA-5C Vigilante 
 
 Another U.S.N. aircraft that employed the J79 and was forced to revise its original 
mission, but in this instance from a fleet nuclear strike bomber to a reconnaissance aircraft 
was the North American A3J Vigilante, later designated the A-5 and RA-5C.137 It was 
originally conceived under an internal North American study under Frank G. Compton to 
study low-level aircraft bombing in 1953. The U.S.N. hoped to retain a portion of the 
nuclear strike role, even though the size of nuclear weapons and the limited size of aircraft 
suitable for carrier launching and landing had limited their abilities. Early U.S.N. aircraft 
capable of carrying and delivering a nuclear bomb had been subsonic aircraft such as the 
Douglas A3D Skywarrior or North American AJ Savage. A concern with these aircraft was 
they lacked the speed to achieve enough safe distance from the shockwaves of 
increasingly stronger nuclear weapons. Compton’s study had concluded future aircraft 
would need to be supersonic in order to escape the resultant shockwaves from the nuclear 
blast, and they required more precise delivery.138  In 1955, the U.S.N. accepted North 
American’s proposal, North American General Purpose Attack Weapon (N.A.G.P.A.W.), 
and a contract was awarded a year later for a Mach 2, high altitude penetration aircraft 
capable of carrying nuclear ordinance, with a secondary mission of low level penetration 
and bombing.  
The North American proposal resulted in the A-5 Vigilante, and it was one of the 
largest aircraft to ever operate on a carrier with high, swept wings that utilized boundary 	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layer air, tandem seats, a tall, single vertical, and two variable intakes commencing under 
the forward edge of the wing root. The Vigilante exhibited a number of new technological 
attributes including single piece wing skins milled from aluminum-lithium, single piece 
acrylic canopy windscreens, and gold plated components within the engine bay to reduce 
engine heat.139 Its unique feature was the internal, cylindrical, linear bomb bay between 
the two engines, which was capable of storing a nuclear weapon, and two disposable fuel 
tanks that were all jettisoned aft of the aircraft when the bomb was released. Despite its 
large size, the Vigilante was still able to break a record when an A-5 flew to 91,451 feet 
carrying a load of 2400 pounds on December 13, 1960.140 But like the B-58, the A-5 was 
confronted with a number of issues over its original operational objective.  
First and foremost, its mission evaporated while it was still in initial production. In 
1963, and known of the certainty of the policy as early as 1961, the U.S.N. relinquished its 
tenuous assertion of carrier aircraft delivering nuclear weapons, yielding to the U.S.A.F. 
the mission of conventional aircraft carrying nuclear weapons.141 The size and speed of 
the Vigilante, then redesigned to A-5B and already in production, became an asset as 
production Vigilantes were converted to reconnaissance versions, or RA-5C’s. The 
reconnaissance versions were capable of carrying an array of different equipment 
including frame and panoramic film, S.L.A.R., and electronic countermeasures to improve 
survivability from S.A.M. attacks.142 This allowed further production of the Vigilante, but 
reconnaissance missions within Vietnam were extremely perilous due to flying along a 	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fixed line at medium level over the previously bombed sites. RA-5C aircrew also faced 
other issues when attempting to take off or land. The linear bomb bay was converted for 
additional fuel tanks, and these were prone to accidental ejection during launches resulting 
in carrier deck fires.143 In spite of the boundary layer control, which was just over the 
trailing edge flaps, the Vigilante demanded a high approach speed for landing on the 
limited deck of carriers. The high approach speeds could cause landing gear or tire failure 
upon landing.144 Additionally, the Vigilante was expensive to procure. Due to the limited 
production run, and even with the additional purchase of thirty-six Vigilantes in 1968 due to 
lost aircraft, development costs were amortized over just one hundred fifty-six aircraft. Due 
to the size, technology, and overall cost per unit, naval commanders were at first reluctant 
to use the Vigilante over hostile terrain over fear of losing one.145 This reluctance was 
overcome and the Vigilante was launched as a reconnaissance platform as naval 
commanders would use the arsenal of aircraft they had available. 
The Vigilante was once conceived as a vehicle that would fly from carrier decks to 
strike deep into Soviet Union territory with nuclear armament as a projection of U.S. and 
U.S.N. dynamic strength, and as an attempt to maintain the established mission of aircraft 
delivery of nuclear bombs to resist the increasing challenge of missiles delivering nuclear 
ordinance. When the mission vanished, it was converted to a reconnaissance aircraft and 
its secondary mission capability of low level penetration and the thrust of the J79’s became 
an asset. This allowed it a longer service life than its U.S.A.F. cousin, the B-58, with the 
RA-5C Vigilante lasting until it was retired in 1979. 
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3.6 The Israel Aircraft Industries Kfir Lion Cub 
 
Over twenty years after its introduction and even though more modern jet engines 
were being manufactured and were in service, another aircraft would employ the J79 in the 
1970’s.  The Israel Aircraft Industries (I.A.I) adapted the J79 for use in its internal Kfir Lion 
Cub all-weather, delta winged, Mach 2 plus aircraft. In the mid-1960’s, Israel requested 
from French manufacturer Dassault Aviation an attack version of its Mirage IIICJ’s, which 
were to be designated the Mirage V.  As the decade progressed the relationship between 
France and Israel was strained due to Israel’s wars with its Arab neighbors and France’s 
engagements and courting of Arab countries surrounding Israel.146 In 1968, France 
imposed an arms embargo on Israel that ended the agreement for the new Mirages, but 
Israel was determined to acquire the aircraft anyway. Israel decided to build a semi-
indigenous aircraft based off drawings and documents acquired through espionage of the 
Mirage V, but redesigned components to fit Israeli hardware, improved the flight dynamics 
and installed the J79 engine.147  
Israel discarded the Mirage’s Snecma Atar 9C engine in favor of a J79-17 due 
foremost to the arms embargo, but also because the J79 could be license built in Israel, 
the recently acquired F-4 Phantoms used the same engine, and it provided higher thrust 
with better fuel consumption including an appreciably greater compression ratio than the 
Atar 9C.148 Due to the J79’s higher operating temperatures, increased air consumption, 	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and shorter but slightly wider geometry, the airframe was reconfigured with larger air inlets, 
the fuselage with shorted and widened along the aft section, and an air inlet was added at 
the base of the vertical tail for the afterburning section of the single J79.149  The Kfir 
entered operational status in 1975, and became a multi-mission aircraft capable of the 
fighter/bomber role.150 With the Kfir, Israel had built its own ground attack fighter aircraft 
capable of Mach 2 performance carrying a larger payload further and faster, and it assisted 
in the cultivation of the Israeli aerospace industry. 
The I.A.I. was able to export the aircraft with some success, including leasing Kfir’s 
to the U.S.N. and U.S.M.C. Due to the installation of the J79 and its potentially sensitive 
technology, sale of the Kfir required U.S. State Department approval for all exports outside 
of Israel.151 Even with this restriction, the Columbian Air Force, the Ecuadorian Air Force, 
and the Sri Lanka Air Force purchased the Kfir. With various hardware and aerodynamic 
upgrades, and despite newer engine technology and proposals for replacements, the Kfir 
powered by the J79 remains in service in these countries at the time of this paper. The 
U.S.N. and U.S.M.C. leased twenty-five Kfirs in 1985, and modified them for further 
maneuverability for training purposes.  Designated as the F-21A, the Kfirs were to be mock 
adversaries in the supersonic aggressor role for fighter training in dissimilar air combat 
training (D.A.C.T.).152  The single engine Kfir was utilized in the role because it could 
represent the characteristics of the quick Soviet Union MiG’s, and it was capable of 
accelerating faster than the already strong performance of the U.S.N.’s dual turbofan 	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engine Grumman F-14 Tomcat.153 With its proven reliability, and low maintenance costs, 
rebuilt Kfir’s have been upgraded with modern avionics and radars as part of a Block 60 
program improvement for sales as a potentially cheaper alternative to other competitor’s 
similar aircraft, with the J79 turbojet remaining as the engine to power the aircraft.154 The 
venerable J79 turbojet remained a relevant performance option to power the aircraft 
despite is juxtaposition against modern hardware nearly sixty years after its introduction. 
 
 
3.7 The General Dynamics F-16/79 Fighting Falcon 
 
Finally in 1980, the J79 was installed in the General Dynamics F-16 to meet then 
president Jimmy Carter’s Presidential Directive 13, and to be part of the Fighter for Export 
(F.X.) program. Designated the F-16/79, the aircraft met the mandates of arms controls to 
limit the transferal of advanced technology to foreign countries within the directive and 
subsequent F.X. program.  With downgraded avionics and the installation of the J79 
turbojet over the P&W F100 turbofan, the F-16/79 was marketed as an inexpensive and 
reliable alternative more appropriate to the requirements of non-N.A.T.O. countries unable 
to afford the expense of the full-fledged model.155  
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The modifications to incorporate the configuration changes and flight-testing of the 
F-16/79 were funded by General Dynamics and General Electric.156 A F-16B model had to 
be adapted with a revised air inlet using a fixed compression ramp due to the lower airflow 
requirements, a longer fuselage to accommodate the J79, over 2,000 lbs of insulation 
shielding due to the higher operating temperatures of the J79, and a secondary air inlet by-
pass system for cooling and airflow management. Flight testing showed the F-16/79 was 
still capable of nine times the gravitational force (9 g’s) turning capability, but due to the 
lower thrust and heavy insulation shielding, its climb performance, fuel consumption, 
range, and sustained turn suffered.157 Hampered by a heavier aircraft and marginally less 
thrust than the newer turbofan, the more reliable J79 were modified to J79-GE-17X 
prototypes, with the final designated of J79-GE-119, and were still capable of accelerating 
the aircraft to Mach 2. 
The ultimate speed of the aircraft would not be enough to garner export sales as 
politics and circumstances ensured the F-16/79’s demise. Although the F.X. program was 
allowed to continue in case a country could not manage the more sophisticated models, 
the basic F-16A/B was also offered for export sales when President Ronald Reagan 
revised the arms sales policy. The potential military and political influence, and the 
economic gains if aircraft sales were lost to other countries’ topline aircrafts ensured the 
basic configuration F-16 was offered for export sales.158 Sales of the F-16 models 
increased due to a perception the F-16/79 was an inferior product with its lesser radar and 	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older turbojet engine, even though the J79 possessed a higher reliability level and thus a 
potentially higher sortie rate.159 No F-16/79 was ever sold for export, or the Northrup F-20 
Tigershark, the other aircraft within the F.X. program. Foreign customers and its military 
had the perception it was acquiring previous generation technology when newer was 
available doomed the program. The F-16/79 was the last new application of the J79 into a 
military aircraft four decades after its introduction as more efficient and powerful low by-
pass turbofans were installed in military fighters, but the J79 would continue to power 
aircraft for decades to come even if it had become mature versus the ever evolving 
technical sophistication of jet engines. 
 
 
3.8 The Chance Vought SSM-N-9 Regulus II  
 
The military attempted to use turbojets to power supersonic guided missiles 
carrying nuclear weapons to be launched from U.S.N. specially manufactured submarines 
or surface cruisers.  The first such missile, the Regulus I, had employed an Allison J33 to 
power it to subsonic speeds, and the initial Regulus II’s had Wright J65’s capable of 
achieving Mach 1.8.160 When the J79 was installed, the speed increased to over Mach 2. 
The missile had been designed to carry nuclear ordinance, and had a conventional aircraft 
type framing architecture with landing for a possible return, but required uniquely designed 
submarines to surface in order to launch the missile. The considerable size of the missiles 	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also limited the number of weapons the ships could carry on a deployment. Additionally, 
the considerable cost of the missiles of over one million dollars, their vulnerability to 
defensive weapons, and the introduction of the solid fuel Polaris Submarine Launched 
Ballistic Missile with its greater accuracy, spelled the end of the Regulus missiles.161 The 
Regulus missile system was meant to be an interim deterrent system using known 
hardware to power a missile quickly and reliably to a target, and the J79 once again had 




3.9 Convair 880 and 990 
 
For G.E., even with a few minor issues, the J79 turbojet had been a huge success 
for military applications, but its commercial use of it presented both advantages and 
disadvantages some of which were out of the control of the company. G.E. had not 
previously been a supplier of commercial engines, not even jet engines prior to the J79. 
Curtiss-Wright and P&W had dominated piston engines within the U.S. market, and P&W 
nearly monopolized the commercial jet engine market with its civilian version of the J57 
turbojet, the JT3, powering the Boeing 707 and the Douglas DC-8.162 G.E. sent executives 
and Neil Burgess to the major airlines within the U.S. and Europe to gage their reaction to 
a G.E. turbojet powered aircraft. Convair, who had experience with the J79 in the B-58, 	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expressed interest and requested a proposal for a J79 to power the 880, its new 
competitor to the 707 & DC-8. The J79 was modified for civilian use by adding a thrust 
reverser, a sound suppressor, and the deletion of the afterburner, and was designated the 
CJ805. The 880 was designed to be a narrow body medium sized jet for medium range 
with configurations capable of carrying ninety-two to one hundred thirty-nine passengers, 
and faster than the 707 or DC-8.163 While the 880 was the fastest commercial aircraft at 
the time powered by the CJ805, it posed problems for both companies.  
For Convair, having the fastest commercial aircraft did not translate into sales of 
the aircraft. Their original customer, Trans World Airlines owned by the mercurial Howard 
Hughes, demanded exclusive operating service for the first year of operations, and only 
paid a relatively small deposit on the first thirty aircraft ordered. This exclusive right, the 
overall size of the aircraft when airlines needed additional seats, production delays, and its 
late arrival into the market dominated by Boeing and Douglas, hampered sales.164  
Additionally, to directly compete with the 880, Boeing released the 707-020, which was 
renamed the 720.165 Convair had anticipated a large order from United Air Lines (U.A.L.) 
for the 880 to bolster its production run, but U.A.L. instead purchased the Boeing 720.  
Desperate for orders, Convair designed a larger and longer-range aircraft for 
American Airlines, designated the 990. The 990 was originally contracted to fly from coast 
to coast as the fastest aircraft, but lacked the range to fulfill the obligation. The design of 
the aircraft was modified, but it was still incapable of its contractual obligation. American 	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threatened termination of the contract, but Convair renegotiated for fewer deliveries and 
thus a financial loss on each aircraft delivered. With few prospects for additional sales, 
Convair was forced to eventually write-off its commercial venture having manufactured just 
114 aircraft between the 880 and 990.166 Convair effectively abandoned the commercial 
jetliner market after the failure, and would not design its own aircraft for a major airliner 
again. 
For G.E. the 880 and 990 were seen as both an achievement and a 
disappointment for the commercial version of the J79 and the company. G.E. could boast it 
powered the fastest commercial airliner in the 880, but it failed to realize the range or fuel 
economy based on the passenger capacity to be a successful commercial aircraft for the 
airlines. Due to the increased size of the 990, airline restrictions for greater passenger 
seats, and its quest to maintain the title of fastest airliner within Convair, the aircraft 
demanded an increase in thrust and fuel economy with a further noise reduction, so a fan 
was added to the engine.  G.E. had experimented with placing a fan at the forward section 
of the engine, but when it was coupled to the available single shaft operating the 
compressor, the engine was difficult to start and run.167 Instead the fan was attached to the 
rear section of the engine. The aft turbofan, designation CJ805-23B, offered the benefit of 
less air pressure against the core of the engine, increased thrust up to 16,000 lbs, and 
increased fuel economy versus regular turbojets, but the aft fan was difficult to install on 
aircraft and required a bulge in the contour of the nacelles covering the rear of the engine.  
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The development of the engines had been costly but it also provided the initial 
foundation for building relationships within the commercial industry. The price of the 
CV805 had cost G.E. eighty million dollars before taxes, but over time spare parts and 
support had reduced the loss.168 When the CV805’s were developed for commercial use, 
G.E. was known as a supplier of jet engines for the military only.169 G.E. did not have 
established relationships with the airlines and was not considered a competitor to the 
established leader of jet engines to the airlines, P&W, as evidenced when Northwest 
Airlines chief executive Don Nyrop commented with contempt during a G.E. engine sales 
proposal that “Whenever I want a light bulb, I pick G.E.”170 G.E. assisted the airlines 
maintenance and support, and continued the development of the engine. The CV805 
program allowed G.E. to establish separate support organizations to handle commercial 
product support and spare parts sales to acquire and grow airline confidence in their 
products. G.E. continued to provide resources to increase the durability of the engine 
despite the associated short term costs. Aerospatiale, the French aerospace company, 
convinced G.E. to purchase a Caravelle and install a pair of CV805-23 turbofan version as 
a demonstrator aircraft for possible sales within Europe. While no customers were 
attracted by the venture, it did establish a relationship between G.E. and the French 
aerospace industry that cultivated in a joint venture with French engine manufacturer, 
Société nationale d’études et de construction de moteurs d’aviation (SNECMA), and the 
CFM56 high by-pass turbofan engine. The Convair 880 and 990 sold in relatively low 
numbers, had cost both companies monetarily, and the CV805 had never achieved the 
fuel economy necessary to surpass its competition, but G.E. was able to parlay it the 	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commercial version of the J79 into a harbinger for future commercial relations and had 
established an organization within G.E. devoted to building that portion of the business. 
The J79 core had been an instrumental base for G.E. to build a reputation and rapport with 
commercial customers despite its origins as a military powerplant.  
 
 
3.10 Development Beyond the J79 
 
For G.E. the success of its military jet engines and its limited, yet foundational 
commercial venture allowed it to foster and expand into related businesses.  In 1961, 
based on the strength and success of the J79 and its prior jet engines, Gerhard Neumann 
took over control of G.E.’s aircraft engine division and continued to develop the business 
by employing an economy of scale to reduce costs. Utilizing another military engine for 
civilian usage, G.E. employed a civilian version of its J85 without an afterburner, the 
CJ610, a small and lightweight turbojet, to gain market share within the business jet sector. 
The CJ610 powered civilian business jets such as the I.A.I. Westwind and the Learjet 23. 
The practice of employing a military jet engine for civilian use reduced the cost per unit. 
This practice continued when G.E. employed its TF34 in the military Lockheed S-3 Viking 
and Fairchild Republic A-10 Thunderbolt II, and applied the engine in the civilian Canadair 
CL601 Challenger. 
 G.E. manufactured a series of military engines that were also operated by 
commercial operators, which also incorporated new design features as well as heritage 
technology. The successor to the J79 came in the YJ93 turbojet with six engines that 
powered the XB-70 Valkyrie, S.A.C.’s prototype large bomber designed in the late 1950’s, 
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and first flown in the early 1960’s to fly at 70,000 feet at Mach 3 to avoid potential 
interceptors. Much like the B-58, the XB-70 was a design that lacked a mission as flying 
high and fast was being replaced by low altitude runs where the XB-70 was only slightly 
faster than an existing B-52.171 The YJ93 was a larger, wider, and heavier engine than the 
J79, produced nearly 30,000 lbs of thrust, and also employed variable stators around a 
single shaft.172 The same engine was to be employed on the U.S. Supersonic Transport 
(S.S.T.) program, which was the U.S. government funded plan to finance a commercial 
supersonic aircraft. Over the objections of maintaining the U.S.’s technical leadership, the 
program was cancelled in 1971 due to cost, sonic booms over populated areas, repeated 
design changes, environmental impact, and economic viability.173 While the YJ93 had not 
been produced in large quantities, it had illustrated the technology of G.E.’s turbojet design 
was capable of the continual development of greater speeds even if ultimate velocity was 
no longer a necessity.  
 G.E. continued the process of utilizing a military powerplant to power commercial 
aircraft with the technology originally developed on the J79. After earlier studies for a 
heavy transport to replace existing large transports, a request for proposals for the 
Cargo/Transport Experimental - Heavy Logistics System (CX-HLS) program was sent out 
to the major aircraft contractors and the engine manufacturers. Curtiss-Wright’s submittal 
was eliminated from the initial competition, and after the down-selection G.E.’s engine 	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proposal beat P&W for a large turbofan capable of powering the aircraft plus 100,000 
pounds of payload.174 The turbofan was designated the TF39 for military application, and 
was capable of 41,000 lbs of thrust, an eight to one air bypass ratio of air entering the 
engine core, with a seven stage variable stator system over the sixteen stage compressor. 
G.E. had always hoped to adopt the engine in commercial applications, and the TF39 
became the CF6 with even higher thrust depending on the engine model. Introduced when 
fuel prices were rising, the CF6 offered vastly better fuel consumption than its competitors, 
and despite initial fan assembly failure issues due to foreign object ingestion and G.E.’s 
limited commercial market experience, the engine was employed on multiple twin, three, 
and four engine wide body aircraft for multiple customers.175  The engine was part of the 
leap in flight performance as great as those seen when the early turbojets were introduced 
into commercial use. The CF6 was another successful engine for G.E., with production 
orders continuing into the 2020’s, over 50 years after its initial service introduction.176 After 
an initial slow start entering the civilian market, G.E. had effectively established itself in the 
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4.0 The Impact of the J79  	  
The ongoing success of G.E. jet engines for both commercial and military applications 
would not have been possible without G.E. taking a risk on an innovative, yet untried 
technology and successfully achieving a desirable turbojet engine capable of Mach 2 plus 
speeds in the J79 turbojet. G.E. had originally hoped the J79 would lead into powering 
bombers, transports, and commercial aircraft besides just fighter/interceptors, much like 
P&W had been able to accomplish with the J57 in the few years prior and within the 
introduction of the J79. The J57 had been utilized in aircraft such as the Martin B-57 
Canberra, the F-100 Super Sabre, the Boeing B-52 Stratofortress, the F-102 Delta Dagger, 
the Douglas A-3 Skywarrior, the F4D Skyray, the F8U Crusader, the Boeing KC-135 
Stratotanker, and the Boeing 707 near the service introduction of the J79 into aircraft. 
P&W was nearly monopolizing both the military and commercial jet engine markets to near 
70% of all military jet engine contracts and all of the commercial contracts by 1958.177  
G.E. had produced several capable jet engines such as the J33 and J47, but it still 
needed a winning engine design or it faced possible elimination from the market. The jet 
engine market for military use within the U.S. in the early 1950’s had started with Allison, 
Continental, Fairchild, G.E., Lycoming, P&W, and Westinghouse. Before the end of the 
decade, Fairchild and Westinghouse left the business and Curtiss-Wright entered the 
arena. Most of the companies had only built license built turbojets or had modified an 
existing engine, and had yet to develop and manufacture their own in-house designed 
engine. G.E. needed to show it could continue to design and build an engine from a “clean 	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sheet” while significantly improving performance.  Companies that had yet to show they 
could design and build their own turbojet engine capable of supersonic speeds were 
increasingly denied requests for proposals of new jet engines for aircraft programs, denied 
research and development funding for competitions, and were finally eliminated from the 
business. By the 1970’s, only Allison, G.E. and P&W remained as manufacturers of larger 
jet engines for the military.   
 The technology surrounding the turbojet required a major commitment and 
investment into the infrastructure, processes, and research in order to succeed within this 
transformative time. The technological demands of supersonic flight contributed to 
changes in materials, manufacturing processes, and test facilities in order to meet the 
challenges to power ever complex systems and heavier airframes. Competition had 
spurred risk and innovation, but it also needed a monetary investment and a willingness to 
change. When visiting the U.S., Frank Whittle saw G.E. was investing twelve times as 
much as Power Jets was in a plant to test compressors and turbines, and in order to meet 
turbojet engine demand, G.E. purchased the old Curtiss-Wright Plant at Evendale near 
Cincinnati, Ohio, which at the time was the second largest manufacturing site in the U.S.178 
Curtiss-Wright, who was the largest producer of reciprocating engines for WWII and into 
the Korean War, was finally out as a major manufacturer of jet engines, because it failed to 
maintain its engineering talent, focused its existing resources on propeller driven engines, 
neglected to invest in research and technology in the face of the changing technology of jet 
engines by producing or redesigning license built jet engines, and rebuffed both 
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commercial and military customers,.179 Further and continual investment by G.E. in the 
Evendale Plant allowed G.E. engineers to perform over 90% of testing at the facility for the 
J79, which in turn reduced the development time significantly.180 G.E. properly capitalized 
on its opportunity within the aircraft engine industry upheaval, yet it did not did not rest on 
its achievement as it continued to resolve issues associated with the J79. 
 While the J79 and the technology associated with it was a gateway for G.E. to 
further build upon within the market, there were obstacles requiring resolution throughout 
its lifecycle. Early in testing of the F-104 Starfighter, the engine experienced 
uncharacteristic flameouts, stalling and high fuel consumption. G.E. installed a dual ignition 
to resolve the flameouts and stalling, and a model configuration change to the J79-GE-7 
alleviated some of the high fuel burn for the F-104.181 The J79 continued to be plagued by 
high fuel consumption, especially when pilots employed the afterburner.  While it was most 
associated with the F-4 Phantom and like most U.S. turbojets, aircraft employing the J79 
displayed a smoke trail that revealed it altitude and trajectory to its foes.  A Smoke 
Abatement system was tried in F-4’s over Vietnam, but an improved solution was finally 
obtained in the J79-GE-17C model when the combustor was redesigned to be shorter with 
a cooling manifold and inner liner, and the intake air was swirled with cross ignition tubes 
along the forward section connecting combustors. Fuel nozzles were also modified for fuel 
atomization to improve the fuel and air mixture, and subsequent ignition.182 Unfortunately, 
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the alleviation of the smoke came late in the service life of the J79, and most pilots were 
forced to contend with the aircraft exposing deficiency before the improvement was 
incorporated, if at all, into the existing platforms.   
  With these and other ongoing enhancements to the engine, it was still considered 
a viable option for fleet modernization programs even decades after the engine was first 
manufactured and newer low by-pass turbofans were potentially available. The I.A.I. still 
utilizes the J79 in its Kfir Block 60 modernization program and considered the J79 capable 
of powering its F-4 to Mach 3 for reconnaissance. In the mid 1980’s, nearly thirty years 
after the J79 introduction, McDonnell Douglas with the help of the G.E. Component 
Improvement Program offered an improved J79 over a turbofan engine in a proposal to 
upgrade the overall performance of F-4’s for use into the 21st century.183 Weighing the cost 
of possibly reconfiguring engine attach points within the aircraft to obtain a potentially 
minor improvement of mission capability with a newer turbofan engine, an existing or 
upgraded J79’s performance proved to be a cost effective alternative.  
 For G.E., even with continual configurations and upgrades over its lifetime, the J79 
was a success economically, and its technological innovation was incorporated into 
subsequent jet engine designs both internally and externally. G.E. has sold over 17,000 
variations of license or internally manufactured J79 engines to cement its position within 
the industry. Even though turbojets were superseded by turbofans, various components 
from the turbojets were added to turbofans. Amongst several different companies, G.E.’s 	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main American engine rival P&W used the variable stator technology, and G.E. eventually 
used P&W’s twin spool technology also. P&W had first used the twin spool technology for 
its J57, and had been successful when it integrated a fan along the forward section of the 
turbojet for a low by-pass turbofan in the JT3D. The twin spool design made it easier to 
combine a forward fan on the engine by coupling the fan to one of the shafts independent 
of the spool for the engine core. For both companies to be successful on successive 
turbofan jet engines, technologies had to be merged in order to achieve the desired thrust 
and fuel consumption. The variable stators allowed more precise control of inlet air onto 
compressor vanes and increased the engine efficiency as the pressure continued to rise in 
engines. The J79 revolutionized the use of variable stators with the technology being used 
on engines by other companies; yet it was a major mechanism in an innovative time for jet 
engines. 
 The J79 was another progressive step in the ongoing jet engine revolution. The jet 
engine had only been introduced into the U.S. within the previous decade of the J79’s first 
flight. The J79’s conception and successive introduction was the first to normalize the 
propulsion of various aircraft to speeds of Mach 2, which was just barely obtainable under 
the most optimum of conditions a few years earlier. The thrust of the J79 allowed it to push 
aircraft to higher speeds both for military and commercial applications, yet it required other 
interrelated innovations in order to achieve these results.  
Advancements in aerodynamics and materials were required as the heat 
generated by the air passing over aircraft flight controls at increased speeds demanded 
new design considerations. New facilities, engineering practices, and even how the aircraft 
programs were managed were adopted to cope with the ever-increasing complexity of 
integrating the various systems into a functional aircraft with the Armed Forces pushing the 
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responsibility of a holistic acquisition to the manufacturers themselves.184  The turbojet 
needed a harmonious union with a proper aerodynamic platform in order to achieve the 
desired results for most aircraft, the F-4 being the exception.  With the additional thrust of 
turbojet engines such as the J79, designers could install improved avionics, new defensive 
countermeasures, and build heavier airframes capable of carrying more fuel and 
armament faster and farther.  Aircraft without enough thrust had been an issue in aircraft 
such as the McDonnell F3H Demon, but the J79 was part of a new group of turbojets with 
the capability to provide enough thrust to allow manufacturers to realize the requirements 
military planners desired.185  The J79 turbojet gave pilots increased throttle response and 
was known to spool up quickly for its immediate throttle responses.186 For pilots and their 
aircraft, “speed is life” and the J79 provided it with greater thrust and fewer stall 
characteristics than previous jet engines.  
For the J79 and other turbojets of the time, the military aided in the development of 
the turbojets by providing complete or supplemental funding for the costly research and 
development efforts and expenses. Without this funding and the impetus for increased 
performance, the majority of the aircraft industry prior to and during W.W. II had not shown 
it was committed to the expenditures necessary for innovative results, preferring quantity 
over quality.187 A cooperative partnership developed between the aircraft industry and the 	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U.S. Armed Forces, which helped foster the new developments and commercial uses of 
the turbojet; a collateral effect that aided everyone. The U.S.A.F. had helped invest in the 
research surrounding the J79 due in part to the outbreak of the Korean War, but also due 
to the perceived threat of nuclear war.  
The U.S. military and politicians wanted a potential deterrent to the perceived 
nuclear threat and manpower advantage of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
(U.S.S.R.), so it needed a vehicle or vehicles with a delivery system for nuclear weapons, 
intercept potential Soviet Union bombers, and with the power and speed to defeat the 
threat of MiG’s.  Speed and altitude capability of aircraft was thought to enable a missile to 
reach its target faster, more reliably, and with the benefit that if desired it could still be 
called back when necessary. Critics of intercontinental nuclear missiles pointed out that 
once the missile was launched, there was no ability to recall it if the situation that first 
caused the launch had been dramatically altered after the fact.188 Mechanical 
malfunctions, human mistakes, or communication errors could cause a missile to be 
launched, but with a manned bomber there was still time for contemplation and recall.  In 
this respect, the J79 was just a component in a nuclear delivery and defensive weapon 
system for S.A.C. and the U.S. government diplomacy efforts against the U.S.S.R. The 
U.S. wanted a jet engine with the strength and flexibility to deliver a nuclear vehicle high 
and fast, and still be able to power a fighter to intercept an incoming threat.  
 For the Armed Forces and the engine industry, setting new records were not only 
for inter-service bragging, but also as propaganda of their potential abilities. Speed and 
altitude records gave a glimpse into the overall capabilities of an aircraft, and the J79 was 
the first to power a production aircraft past Mach 2. While records were quantifiable, they 	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were still only subjective proof of an ability to get missiles delivered or intercepted. The 
achievements did not quantify the quality of the aircraft. The Century Series aircraft, the 
nickname given for the series of fighter produced in the 1950’s and early 1960’s with the 
designation in the 100’s such as the F-101 Voodoo, were all designed to carry a nuclear 
weapon. Most of the Century Series aircraft were progressively able to fly higher and 
faster, had a wider combat radius, and could carry considerable bombing loads, but about 
half of them were unable to turn well and lacked maneuverability, making them poor 
fighters for air-to-air combat. Most were just interceptors and small penetration bombers.189 
These aircraft and the engines necessary to power them were a reaction to the previous 
conflicts and fulfilled a perceived need to deliver weapons ranging up to a nuclear bomb.  
An actual bomber capable of delivering a nuclear bomb as a quick first strike or 
even a second strike option flying high and fast to the target, while being able to avoid 
enemy interceptors, was thought to be achieved in the B-58. The B-58 and fighters of the 
time were part of ever increasing nuclear delivery system that were both functional for the 
military and posturing for politicians to ensure both the capability to deliver a nuclear bomb 
and to ensure one did not get dropped. Being able to project strength or the perception of 
power could also ensure nuclear weapons were not used. John Lewis Gaddis noted, ”The 
problem now was not so much how to defeat an adversary as how to convince him not to 
go to war in the first place.”190  The J79 and other jet engines of the time aided in this type 
of strategy in that they were a mechanism in the strategy of S.A.C. and politicians to put 
bombs on targets as quickly as possible to ensure a possible war was as terrible as 	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possible so an adversary did not consider the option. 
 The J79 was not just merely a portion of a strategy, but was also a piece in an 
overall technology race between Cold War adversaries after WWII that started with the 
atomic bomb. Aircraft speed and altitude capability was increasing, and the U.S. strategy 
was to show its technological might with these achievements.  The J79 was the first jet 
engine to propel an aircraft past Mach 2. Speed was thought to be a valuable resource to 
deliver a weapon or to intercept incoming fighters or bombers due to range and time to 
reach the threat needed to protect assets. Mach-2-plus speed gave military planners the 
capability for interceptors to reach threats within dogfight range before a bomber could 
reach its intended target and the bomber had the speed to reach its target before it was 
intercepted. The Soviet Union met this advance with its own Mach 2 interceptor in the MiG-
25 Foxbat, and countered with more maneuverable fighters, and increased range from 
S.A.M.’s, which made flying at high altitudes obsolete.   
 Some individuals within the U.S. viewed Soviet air power between WWII and the 
Korean War with contempt and derision. After WWII, both the U.S. and Soviet forces had 
obtained German aeronautical and rocket scientists and their data, which became a 
catalyst for the aerospace industries in both countries. Still experiencing technical 
difficulties with jet engines, and with their latest MiG aircraft design slowed by the need for 
a suitable engine, the Soviet government requested from the British government Rolls 
Royce centrifugal Nenes and Derwent turbojets in 1946. Even though Stalin wondered with 
bewilderment “What fool will sell us their secret?” they were still able to acquire twenty-five 
Nenes and thirty Derwents which were promptly reverse-engineered and enhanced as VK-
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1 engines installed in MiG-15’s.191 These events, the revelation of a series of espionage 
cases such as Klaus Fuchs who revealed atomic secrets to Soviet agents, and general 
propaganda gave rise to the belief that Soviet technology was simple and inferior, was not 
inventive, and their abilities laid “in their own plodding way systematic research with 
endurance and singleness of purpose, to devise solutions of expediency, and to design 
matériel which is well adapted to the general backwardness of the country.”192  
The MiG-15 was a shock to this belief as it outclassed P-80 and B-29’s, and was a 
formidable opponent to the F-86 in Korea. U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff and General Hoyt 
S. Vandenberg helped solidify the mystique of the MiG-15 when he testified before the 
Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committee that “they [the Soviet Union] 
have a jet engine in the MiG-15 that is superior to any jet engine that we have 
today…They have the advantage of speed and climb and operations at altitude.”193 The 
U.S. military was able to analyze the true abilities of the MiG-15 when North Korean pilot 
Ro Kum Suk landed a MiG-15 in Kimpo Air Base, South Korea, on September 21, 1953.194 
After analysis and test flights by pilots, including Chuck Yeager, it was concluded the 
aircraft had advantages and disadvantages, and the engine was improved over the original 
Rolls Royce Nene.  
 Soviet engineers continued the development of jet engines by producing their own 
jet engines. Much like their engineering counterparts in other countries, centrifugal jet 	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engines gave way to more efficient and powerful axial flow engines. Soviet engineers 
faced similar issues of controlling power and stall, and also turned to both the twin spool 
and variable stator technology. The dual spool for Soviet engines was first developed in 
1956, and utilized in engines such as the Tumansky R-11 for use in the MiG-21 and then 
the Sukhoi Su-15 Flagon interceptor. In the early 1960’s, in one of the last turbojets 
designed by any Soviet manufacturer, variable stators were employed on the Lyulka AL-21 
jet engine, which was installed in Su-17 Fitters and Su-24 Fencers. Although produced 
years after the J79, the AL-21 represents the Soviet turbojet that is most similar to the J79, 
and like the J79, the AL-21 remains in operation at this time with the Su-24.   
The combination of speed and maneuverability of MiG-15s in the Korean War had 
diminished U.S. military strategy and bombers, and it happened again when agile MiG’s in 
Vietnam revealed the limitations of purpose built interceptors that lacked the agility to 
compete. Aircraft such as the Republic F-105 Thunderchief suffered high losses during 
bombing runs early in the war over Vietnam, and was eventually removed from the theater 
due to these failures.195 The versatility of the J79 powered F-4 Phantom II showed an 
aircraft could operate successfully within multiple missions from attack runs to 
reconnaissance, and with the appropriate tactics it was able to dogfight even if was not 
maneuverable enough to compete in all aspects of a flight envelope. Even with this 
adaptability, the F-4 could not operate within different roles on the same mission revealing 
its limitations.  
The subsequent generation of fighters such as the U.S.N. Grumman F-14 Tomcat 	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and the U.S.A.F. McDonnell Douglas F-15 Eagle were designed to be fighters, and some 
were designed to operate dual roles within the same mission such as the McDonnell 
Douglas/Northrup F/A-18 Hornet. These aircraft did not have significant increases in 
ultimate speed, if any at all, as the military found it was unnecessary for missions 
(reference Graph 4.0A: U.S. Fighters Top Achievable Speed). Bombers followed the trend 
as succeeding aircraft from the B-58 such as the Rockwell B-1B Lancer and B-2 Spirit 
would not fly anywhere close to Mach 2 (reference Graph 3.2A: U.S. Bomber Maximum 
Speed Capability Historical Perspective). More sophisticated avionics and accompanying 
missiles gave aircraft the ability to detect an enemy aircraft beyond visual and fire upon 
them, further reducing the necessity for an ultimate speed aircraft. Land-based, solid-
fueled, intercontinental ballistic missiles further reduced the critical need for high speed 
within U.S. fighters, as bombers were no longer seen as the only first strike option so 
interceptors were no longer a necessity. The generation of fighters built for maneuverability 
was eventually complimented with aircraft designed for stealth or low observable features 
to elude or reduce radar signature.  
The design and mission profile of aircraft were revised through subsequent 
generations, and the J79 and its innovations were seen in engines for these aircraft.  The 
performance of the J79 was persuasive enough to be considered for use in aircraft from 
different generations.196The J79 was at the end of the evolutionary refinement of the 	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turbojet and the beginning of the turbofan era. Turbojets were transcended by more 
efficient turbofans, and G.E. attempted to make the J79 more fuel-efficient by adding a fan 
along the aft section of the engine for commercial applications, but the industry chose 
forward fans.  The technology feature that enabled the J79 to be a single spool turbojet 
with stall free characteristics in the variable stators was utilized in turbofans for both 
commercial and military applications. As an example, the G.E. F404 low by-pass turbofan 
applied variable stators to its powerplant for both subsonic and supersonic aircraft in the 
subsonic Lockheed F-117 Nighthawk stealth fighter and the supersonic F/A-18 Hornet. 
The F404 was designed to build upon the stall free operation of the J79 while still being 
able to cope with the varying throttle inputs of pilots and high angle of attack capability of 
the newer generation of fighters such as the F/A-18.  Even as aircraft increased their flight 
envelope with ever increasing maneuverability, the J79 and its technological achievements 
were still relevant for aircraft across multiple generations.  
The significance of the technology and thrust provided by the J79 was not lost on 
another industry seeking to establish straight-line records of speed never seen before on 
land. In the 1960’s, racers looked to set a land speed record employing surplus military jet 
engines. This was not a new phenomenon as some vehicles in the 1920’s were purposely 
built to break existing speed records.197 In the 1930’s, British racers Malcolm Campbell, 
John Cobb, and George E.T. Eyston traded the land speed record back and forth until, 
after a hiatus for WWII, Cobb reached 394 m.p.h. in 1947.   After WWII, the popularity of 
quarter-mile races between competing automobiles grew in popularity in the U.S. Art 	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Arfons, a navy diesel mechanic during WWII, and his half-brother Walt Arfons obtained a 
war surplus U.S.A.A.C. Allison V-12 for a Lockheed P-38 Lightning, and stuffed it into a 
dragster nicknamed the “Green Monster.” The dragster reached over 300 m.p.h. at the 
Bonneville Salt Flats, and was sold because newer turbojets engines were becoming 
available.  
After a dispute arose, a rivalry developed between the Arfons brothers and Craig 
Breedlove to establish the record. Art Arfons acquired and rebuilt a damaged J79 without a 
repair manual from a F-104, and Craig Breedlove first used a J47 turbojet before switching 
to a J79 from a F-4 for their respective racers. In 1963, Breedlove claimed the speed 
record of 407 m.p.h. using the J47 in his Spirit of America vehicle over two other racers; 
Nathan Ostich, and Glenn Leasher who crashed and was killed making his attempt at the 
record. Walt Arfons’ car, the Wingfoot Express, powered by a J46 briefly set the record at 
413 m.ph. Then over the next three years Art Arfons and Craig Breedlove raised the land 
speed record eight times before Breedlove finally capped it at just over 600 m.p.h. in a 
nearly back and forth battle for supremacy in the their J79 powered racers. Art attempted 
to take the record again, but crashed at just over 600 m.p.h. suffering only minor injuries in 
what would have been a record run.198 After the crash, no other attempt was made by the 
pair as interest in establishing the record diminished until it was subsequently broken by a 
rocket powered racer almost four years later. British racer Richard Noble broke the record 
again in 1983, and eventually he cracked the sound barrier in 1997. While the record was 
a remarkable technological achievement, the excitement of racers in the 1960’s utilizing 
J79’s and other turbojets was never duplicated. In the 2000’s, a joint Canadian and 	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American group led by Ed Shadle and Keith Zanghi used the fuselage of a F-104 and a 
rebuilt J79 out of a F-4 from Davis-Monthan in Arizona for their North American Eagle 
Project.199 As of this writing, testing is still being performed with speed exceeding 400 mph 
verified.200 Much like Curtiss JN-4 “Jenny’s” after World War I that were used by 
barnstormers, North American P-51 Mustangs used by racers in the Bendix Trophy 
transcontinental air race after WWII, military hardware had found its way into civilian hands 
for exhibition and racing. The most technologically sophisticated jet engine of the 1950’s 
used to power aircraft to speeds exceeding Mach 2 for military defense and to power the 
fastest commercial aircraft was used to power vehicles on land to over 600 mph by 
civilians just over ten years later.  
The J79 had found its way into a multitude of different applications ranging from 
the 1960’s movement of racers seeking to break land speed records to military and 
commercial aircraft seeking to be the fastest in their given industry. As of this writing, the 
J79 has seen seven different decades and will be around at least into the eighth, which is 
a remarkable achievement given it was a just an element of the technology refinement at 
the end of the turbojet era before more efficient turbofans supplanted them as the 
powerplant of choice for both commercial and military aircraft. At the time the J79 was 
conceived, it was believed the dual shaft turbojet was the logical choice because it was 
already producible, and a single shaft turbojet was thought to be highly inefficient due to all 
of the components spinning about a single axis.201 G.E. was given the contract to bring 	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functionality to the technology because the U.S. Armed Forces needed an engine capable 
of powering bombers and interceptors to speeds exceeding Mach 2. Using technology that 
another company had abandoned because it was thought to be unfeasible, G.E. produced 
a relatively inexpensive engine that produced a high amount of thrust with quick response 
from throttle inputs, and alleviated most of the stall conditions plaguing previous turbojet 
engines. The engine proved G.E. was capable of resolving technological problems and 
incorporating new technology into the refinement of the turbojet engine allowing G.E. to be 
viewed as a major manufacturer for the military, and it gave them access to commercial 
aviation industry. The J79’s variable stators automatically adjusted, which was a further 
step in allowing pilots to focus on flying their aircraft and the mission instead of worrying 
about the throttle position at a specific flight envelope possibly inducing a stall.  
Ultimately, the J79 was a piece in the overall Cold War military strategy and the 
further refinement in a technology revolution. The speed and altitude abilities of the MiG-
15’s in the Korean War had shown U.S. Armed Forces strategists that slow flying bombers 
and pursuit aircraft could not compete, and new engines and aircraft were needed to 
combat the threat. MiG-15’s were more advanced technologically than comparable U.S. 
aircraft and thus the delivery system of bombers for atomic weapons were no longer 
capable of performing the mission. The Korean War revealed that a limited war where the 
threat of atomic bombing could keep adversaries from openly fighting each other without 
resorting to the use of atomic weapons. A limited war without nuclear weapons is only 
achievable if the adversary believes its enemy is still capable of delivering these weapons.  
The U.S. military needed a leap in speed and altitude capability so they helped sponsor 
firms such as G.E. to provide the powerplants to fulfill their goals. G.E. delivered with the 
J79, and at least for a time gave S.A.C. a bomber capable of high altitudes and Mach 2 
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performance to potentially deliver nuclear weapons in the B-58 and to potentially intercept 
Soviet bombers with Mach 2 interceptors in the F-104 and F-4. The J79 was the leap 
forward in speed capability of over Mach 2 at level flight and higher altitude abilities S.A.C. 
demanded all while producing a technological achievement in variable stators, which 
helped to reduce stall characteristics that only a few years before the J79’s introduction 
had been accomplished only under the most ideal circumstances with experimental 
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Wright Flyer III 
Graph 3.2A: U.S. Bomber Maximum Speed Capability Historical 
Perspective 
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Required Demonstrated Capability
Mmax - Maxiumum Power Mach 2.04 2.03
Mmax - Military Power Mach 0.99 1.01
Rate of Climb at 35000 ft
Maximum Power
Feet/Minute 12.258 17.500




Time to Accelerate from 
Military Rated Thust Vmax to 
Mmax at 35000
Minute 0.81 0.59








Combat Gross Weight Pounds 36817 36817
F-4A
System Parameters Units
Table 3.4A: F-4A Phantom II Requirements 
Date Parameters Record
06 DEC 1959 Altitude 98,557 ft
05 SEP 1960 500 km Closed Course 1216.76 mph
25 SEP 1960 100 km Closed Course 1390.24 mph
24 MAY 1961 Los Angeles to New York 2 hr 49 min 9.9 sec
28 AUG 1961 3 km 902.769 mph
22 NOV 1961 15/25 km 1606.342 mph
05 DEC 1961 Sustained Altitude 66,443.8 ft
21 FEB 1962 Time to Climb: 3,000 m 34.52 sec
21 FEB 1962 Time to Climb: 6,000 m 48.78 sec
01 MAR 1962 Time to Climb: 9,000 m 61.62 sec
01 MAR 1962 Time to Climb: 12,000 m 77.15 sec
01 MAR 1962 Time to Climb: 15,000 m 114.54 sec
31 MAR 1962 Time to Climb: 20,000 m 178.50 sec
03 APR 1962 Time to Climb: 25,000 m 230.44 sec
04 APR 1962 Time to Climb: 30,000 m 371.43 sec
Table 3.4B: F-4 World and Class Records Set
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